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This study examines the effect oil has on the onset and duration of conflict. In the
"resource curse" literature, researchers argue that a state's abundance in natural resources
can raise the likelihood of civil war. Such findings are largely based on correlations from
large-n statistical studies or are hypotheses from individual case studies. These
approaches fail to check the causal validity of key variables in multiple cases. Using a
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data-set comprised of sixteen countries that have experienced both oil extraction and civil
war, this study conducts a qualitative causal variable analysis within these cases, while
also checking the causal significance of key variables across cases. This study of oil-
related civil wars analyzes the cross-case validity and overall relevance of: rebel greed,
citizen grievances, unemployment in oil-rich regions, state military spending, c1ientelistic
patterns of oil rent distribution, and oil-sector nationalization schemes.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In September of2005, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution
1625 (2005). After years of monitoring armed conflicts and wars throughout the world,
the United Nations was finally impelled to formally acknowledge the role that natural
resources play in situations of conflict. Under this resolution, the UN pledged to reaffirm
its, "determination to take action against illegal exploitation and trafficking of natural
resources and high~value commodities in areas where it contributes to the outbreak,
escalation or continuation of armed conflict."} Perhaps realizing the true value of
considering the natural resources element in efforts to understand and resolve conflicts,
the UN Security Council issued another resolution, SIPRST/2007, which included several
pages of acknowledgement to the role natural resources can play in armed conflict - a
much more thorough and encompassing transcript than the previously devoted single line
in Resolution 1625 (2005). It seems with the adoption of these two resolutions, and the
further mention in consequent reports, statements, and resolutions, the United Nations has
finally recognized the relevance and importance ofwhat a burgeoning group of
researchers have been studying ~ the notion ofa "resource curse."
Since the 1990s, academics have increasingly found connections between a state's
wealth in natural resources and its increased likelihood of poor performance in economic,
}United Nations Security Council 1625 (2005)
2development, and security considerations. Scholars such as Richard Auty, Paul Collier,
Anke Hoeffler, Michael Ross, and Michael Klare have made compelling arguments
against the seemingly logical assumption that natural resources can only serve as a
positive tool contributing to a state's ability to establish a healthy and viable economy,
provide life-supporting resources and systems for its citizens, and more generally, simply
prosper. Using statistical analyses, case-study examinations, and research derived from
states throughout the world, such scholars have proven that indeed, natural resources are
not always a blessing, and in many situations are a curse.
There of course is nothing inherently evil or destructive about natural resources
themselves, but what can be deleterious is the relationship humans have with the
management, exploitation, distribution, and consumption of the resources. Although the
resource curse literature touches on a variety of "evils" arising from a state's wealth in
natural resources, this study will focus on one particular element of the curse ~ conflict.
Just as economists have indicated the poor performance of natural resource-rich states,
social scientists have also indicated the increased likelihood of civil war in states
abundant in diamonds, timber, minerals, hydrocarbons, and other such natural resources.
This resource conflict theory establishes the argument that a state wealthy in natural
resources, and particularly reliant on those resources, will be more likely to experience
civil war and conflict than a state which is less dependent or rich in such materials. This
paper is intended to explore the various arguments included within the resource conflict
literature, as well as test their validity through case study analysis.
3In a letter sent to the United Nations Security Council, a group ofNGOs2
suggested that a definition of a "conflict resource" be adopted in order to determine when
and if a resource becomes a contributing variable to conflict. From their proposal,
"Conflict resources are resources that have been traded in a way that drives violent anned
conflict and threatens national and regional security.,,3 Using the concept of resource
conflicts, and this definition of conflict resources, this study will examine the role that
one particular resource, oil, plays in influencing the outbreak and duration of civil war. In
order to identifY the role ofoil in intrastate conflict, I will examine a set of variables
mostly derived from other scholars' work on resource conflict including: oil as a primary
commodity export; oil as a salable commodity used to finance military expenditures; the
grievances of civilians in oil-rich regions; the nature and structure of oil-governing
entities; the distribution of oil rents; the relevance of "booty futures"; interests and
motivations of armed rebel groups, and; factors concerned with poverty and
unemployment in oil-rich regions. A data-set composed of sixteen case studies in which
both civil war and oil extraction has occurred provides the analytical substance ofthis
study. Applying the above variables to the sixteen case studies has resulted in significant
findings which both weaken and strengthen various arguments made within the resource
conflict literature linking oil to war. The intention of this study is to provide comparative
case analysis and causal quality checking to the assertions previously made by resource
2 NGO signatories of the proposal include: Global Policy Forum, Global Witness, Human
Rights Watch, International Peace Academy, Save the Children Alliance.
3 Global Policy Forum,"NGO proposals on Natural Resources and Conflict,"
4conflict scholars. By applying their theories and hypothesized variables to an actual data
set of relevant oil-related conflicts, the validity of those theories and variables may be
better tested. The following literature review will lay out the existing scholarship on the
resource curse, resource conflict, and the influence of oil in security studies. From this
review, the arguments and theorized variables will be identified and introduced in order
to equip the reader with the information needed for a full understanding ofthis study's
scope and findings.
5CHAPTER II
THE EXISTING "RESOURCE CURSE" LITERATURE
It would make logical sense that a state's wealth in natural resources would do
nothing but enrich its economic prosperity and its citizens' quality of life. Surely, states
wealthy in valuable high-commodity resources face fewer challenges than those states
which are barren and resource-starved. Although some case examples support this
notion, there exist a large collection ofexamples that directly contradict this type of logic.
Whereas resource-rich countries like Iceland, Canada, and Norway have succeeded and
benefitted economically, politically, and socially from their wealth in natural resources,
other states such as Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Timor-Lest4 have
failed miserably to manage their natural resources in an effective way for positive
development. Prompted by this phenomenon - the weak performance of some resource-
rich states - researchers have set out to establish the specifications, contributing elements,
consequences, and other such aspects of this conceived notion of a "resource curse."
The Roots ofthe Resource Curse
Although much of the resource curse literature is a result of research and studies
conducted within the past ten years, a founding principle guiding the progress of the area
4 The mentioned six states enjoy plentiful bounties of accessible natural resources,
however according to the UNDP's Human Development Index list for 2009, Iceland,
Norway, and Canada all ranked in the top three for highest HDI scores, whereas Chad,
DRC, and Timor-Lest all fell in the bottom human development tier.
6study was first published by The Economist, in 1977.5 The concept of "Dutch Disease"
was coined as a term to describe a significant decline in the manufacturing sector in the
Netherlands which had detrimental effects across the state's whole economy following
the discovery of bountiful natural gas fields within Dutch borders. The gas discovery
created an export boom resulting in positive returns for the Dutch economy, but soon
after the state was plagued with inflation, a decline in manufacturing exports, and an
increase of the real exchange rate which corresponded with increased unemployment and
an overall decline in the Netherlands's economic productivity. This observation of
"Dutch Disease" was perhaps the first widely recognized example of how a state's wealth
in natural resources (in this case, natural resource belonging to the hydrocarbon sector
and therefore particularly relevant to this study), has the potential to harm an economy,
rather than help it.6
Stemming from the Dutch Disease concept, more and more research supported the
resource curse notion as more and more examples of resource rich states' decline and
lack of progress emerged. Although one of the primary focuses of the resource curse is
to address economic and development concerns, in the late 1990s, researchers began to
make the connection between the resource curse and its expanded relevance in conflict
5 The Economist. "The Dutch Disease" The Economist, November 26, 1977.
6 Hans Singer and Raul Prebisch contributed to this notion and further asserted that
primary commodity exporters suffer declining terms of trade over extended periods of
time, will experience balance of payment problems, and will have slow economic growth
(Prebisch and Singer, 1950). Two other prominent academics, Sapsford and
Balasubramanyan, found further evidence supporting the Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis
(Brendan McSherry, "The Political Economy of Oil in Equatorial Guinea," African
Studies Quarterly, 2006).
7and security studies.7 From the resource curse literature grew a sub-set of theoretical
study - natural resource conflict. The main argument that this field presents, is that
resource abundance can playa direct causal role in creating conditions contributing to
state insecurity while increasing the likelihood of a state to experience anned conflict
within its borders. 8 It is this research sub-set of the resource curse, resource conflict, that
this study will address.
Resource Conflict Theory
Since the late 1990s and early 2000s, the study of resource conflict has
increasingly attracted more and more scholars and researchers in their attempts to unravel
questions concerning issues of security and armed conflict. Most of the existing studies
on this subject are steeped in theoretical and hypothetical discussions based on analyses
of either large-n statistical data, or evidence gleaned from single case study examination.
The work conducted in these tests are valid, and provide insightful theories and ideas
important to the growth and development of the resource conflict field, but often fail to
prove their variables' legitimacy as valid causal agents. It appears that many of the
7 Note however, that much of the conflict and security studies elements of resource
conflicts relies on evidence and conditions relative to economic and financial situations.
Therefore, the natural resource conflict may be seen as a distinct entity within the
resource curse literature, but certainly relies on economic-heavy concepts, variables, and
theories.
8 For the sake of congruity within the field, "armed conflict" will imply situations of civil
war. There is a recognized criteria that a situation of conflict must meet before its status
can be elevated from "conflict" to "war" (including a quota of battle deaths occurring
within a year, etc.). These effectiveness and necessity of such criteria has been debated,
but for the sake of this study, conflict and civil war will be used interchangeably,
ultimately indicating that the referred situation has met the criteria to be considered a
"civil war." (Anna Edgerton, "How Violent Conflicts Are Counted," 2007)
8variables and theories suggested as relevant influences in resource conflict are just that,
suggestions. While theoretically many of the proposed ideas make logical sense and
present strong arguments, they have not all been backed by the necessary methodological
testing able to validate the legitimacy of their stated claims. Furthermore, many of the
presented variables and theories are contested. For instance, while some researchers
argue that, upon the grounds of statistical (quantitative) evidence, a state's export
percentage of natural resources is an indicator of its likelihood of conflict, other
researchers argue that (qualitative) application of the export variable results in the
findings that such percentages play no indicative role in determining or predicting a
state's likelihood of conflict. So how does one know whether or not a variable, such as a
state's natural resource export percentage, is significant in influencing conflict? It is the
purPOse of this study to answer such questions. Below is a discussion of the various
theories, variables, and arguments presented by contributing researchers within the
current body of resource conflict literature. Adopting their concepts, I will test their
theorized variables against a comprehensive data set comprised of sixteen case studies in
which both civil war and oil production has occurred. By applying each variable to each
case study, it will become apparent whether or not the variable is relevant. This method
of causal-variable checking will result in findings capable ofpositing whether or not a
variable is relevant, and therefore capable of influencing, circumstances of "oil wars."
9CHAPTER III
INTRODUCTION TO THE VARIABLES
Resource conflict expert Michael T. Klare provides an encompassing description
about what sorts of issues are pertinent in wars fueled by natural resources. He writes,
"The relentless expansion in worldwide demand, the emergence of significant resource
shortages, and the proliferation of ownership contests is likely to introduce new stresses
into the international system...as resource consumption grows, shortages will emerge
more rapidly and governments will come under mounting pressure to solve the problem
at any COSt.,,9 Klare also posits that states under stress will seek maximum control over
resource supplies and will therefore contribute to the risk of conflict as interests for those
limited supplies will create escalating competition. Klare, and others scholars in the
field, have projected that resources such as water, diamonds, timber, minerals, and
relevant to this study, oil, will emerge as the type of natural resources most likely to be
fought over in the future. This brief analysis of Klare's work higWights the basic crux of
the natural resource problem; natural resources are valuable (in some cases life-
sustaining) and with more and more competition for access to those natural resources, the
more and more precious they become. The more precious natural resources become, the
more people will do to protect their access to them. As the stakes rise over natural
resource access, people will be more and more willing to heighten their actions in order
9 Michael Klare, Resource Wars The New Landscape a/Global Conflict (New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 2001), 23.
10
to secure that access. As the field of resource conflict has found, often that "heightened
action" translates to armed conflict.
Accepting the notion of "resource conflict" as a legitimate influence in
international affairs, scholars then set out to uncover the specifics of this phenomenon.
The incentive for warring over resources is obvious - natural resources can be
transformed into valuable commodities and whoever controls those resources has the
ability to enrich and provide quality standards of living (in an economic sense). Perhaps
what is less obvious about natural resources' connection to conflicts are questions
addressing the type ofresource, the human relations influencing the governance and
distribution of the resource, the relationship the resource and its extraction has with local
populations, the economic ramifications of its sale and distribution, etc. The following
researchers have studied such questions, and responded with their own theories,
hypotheses, and concepts of which will be used as testable variables for this study. The
testable variables developed for the use of this study were derived largely from the
following resource conflict suppositions:
-when natural resources (particularly oil) serve as a state's primary export commodity,
that state will have a greater likelihood of civil conflict;
-citizen and opposition group grievances (poverty, unemployment, etc.) can lead to the
escalation of armed conflict;
-opposition groups (often armed) are likely to mobilize when responding to governing
bodies heavily influenced by patronage and clientelistic relationships;
11
-governments which are less democratic are unlikely to employ equitable distribution of
natural resource rents, leading to conflict;
-"booty futures" or the sale of future ownership rights to natural resources may contribute
to a prolonged conflict;
-natural resources may be considered "lootable goods" whose sale may be used as
financing mechanisms for armed groups leading to lengthened conflicts;
-states' coffers emiched by oil revenue are likely to correspond with high levels of
military spending, and;
-oil conflicts tend to be secessionist in nature.
As mentioned earlier, the prime objective of this study is to examine and identify
any common affects that oil has on conflict. More specifically, this study examines how
oil, as a natural resource, possesses the capacity to induce the onset ofconflict, and serve
as a catalyst or influence capable of affecting the duration ofconflict. Each of the above
assertions/variables can be divided into factors relative to conflict onset, and factors
relative to conflict duration. Dividing the variables in those two distinct groups, the
following section provides summaries of the existing literature relative to the onset
variables, and the duration variables.
"Greed and Grievance" and the Onset Arguments
A central focus within the study of conflict is the attempt to identify why conflict
happens. Ideally, in identifying the factors that contribute to the onset of conflict,
researchers, policy-makers, and professional practitioners will be better equipped to
prevent them from occurring. Much of the existing resource conflict research analyzing
12
the factors capable of contributing to the onset of conflict revolve around considerations
of "greed" and "grievance."lo Work done by Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon and
Laitin (2003), Le Billon (2001), and Humphreys (2005) has contributed to the literature
addressing the influences of these two motivating factors in resource conflicts. The greed
and grievance theories present evidence suggesting that armed conflicts result from
groups' recognition of what may be gained by taking up arms. Relative to resource
conflicts, in the grievance scenario, it is suggested that armed groups mobilize and
engage in conflict as a result of an unresolved complaint, injustice, repression, neglect, or
other such form of "grievance." In the civil war context, the grievance is often born out
of the citizenry, with the charges brought against the government or governing body. The
result of unmet demands results in violent conflict. In the greed scenario, theorists argue
that states rich in natural resources are prone to attacks from opportunity-seeking entities.
Realizing the economic benefits of controlling a resource like oil, it is argued that rebel
groups and opposition groups mobilize and engage in armed conflict in attempts to seize
control and the resulting rents of a resource. The onset of greed-motivated conflicts
highlights the inherent incentive tied to the ability to access and control natural resources.
Within the greed and grievance literature, various scholars have attempted to pin-
point the specific conditions, characteristics, environments, and population compositions
that serve as instigating factors of conflict. Research addressing the relationships
between natural resources and primary export commodities, citizen grievances, systems
10 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," Oxford
Economic Papers, 2004.
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of governance, and rent distribution have contributed to the overall understanding of
resource conflict onset.
Primary Commodity Export
Theories and models have been created as forms of risk assessment strategies
capable of identifying the propensity a particular state or region has towards the break out
of civil war. One of the first studies done to do this resulted in the Collier-Roeffler
Model of Civil War onset. 11 Scholars Paul Collier and Anke Roeffler theorized that by
examining resource export figures, one is able to predict the risk of civil war onset for
any given state. Their results, based on large-n statistical analysis, found that states
heavily reliant on natural resources as their primary export commodity face a much
higher risk of civil war than states not as dependent on natural resource exports. In a
subsequent study, scholar Fearon acknowledged Collier and Roeffler's assertion, but
argued that the primary commodity export factor was only relevant in states dependent on
oil as the exported resource. Responding to the claims made by Collier and Roeffler, and
Fearon, scholars Ross, Lujala, and Fearon all refuted the total validity of the primary
commodity dependence theory. This disagreement in scholarship represents the study's
first testable variable. Applying Collier and Roeffler's, and Fearon's12 predictions (that
when a state reaches a certain percentage of GDP represented by the export of natural
resources/oil the state will likely experience civil war) to the data included in the sixteen
11 Jean-Paul Azam, Paul Collier and Anke Roeffler, "International Policies on Civil
Conflict: an Economic Perspective," 2001.
12 James D. Fearon, "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?"
Journal ofPeace Research 2004.
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case study data set, it will become evident whether or not primary commodity export
percentages serve as influential factors capable of impacting state security. Although this
issue does not fall easily into a greed or grievance category, it is still a valid factor
contributing to the onset of conflict.
Rentier States, Governance, and Democracy
Another variable significant to the study of resource conflict onset is governance
structure. The transparency, levels of corruption, structuring, democratic development,
and power exhibited by a governing body can significantly affect a state's propensity for
civil war. The resource curse literature has adopted this political approach in explaining
conditions of conflict in resource-rich countries. Scholar, Hazem Beblawi, presents the
concept of a rentier state as a conditional contributor to conflict onset. He defines the
rentier state as one which derives the bulk of its revenue from external rents, rather than
productive enterprises. 13 The affect of a rentier state is likened to the affect Collier and
Hoeffler described in their discussion of primary commodity exports. Furthering the
notion of rentier states within the resource conflict field, other academics have claimed
that oil rents result in less accountable and responsive governments and the general
population loses its effective voice in expressing needs and grievances. On this note,
Hootan Shambayati argues that rentier state governments implement low tax plans and
extensive welfare programs as a method of pacification. If the people feel less pressure
from taxation, they may not feel that democratic representation is justified or expected.
Spinning the slogan, "no taxation without representation," the rentier state is more
13 Hazem Beblawi, "The Rentier State in the Arab World," The Arab State, 1990.
15
appropriately described as having, "no representation without taxation.,,14 Social welfare
projects through the state act as a sort ofacquiescing band-aid on this democratic
failure. 15 In one publication, the scholar Ross goes as far to argue that statistically,
natural resource wealth and democracy are negatively correlated. 16 In the context of
resource conflict, this lack of democratic development is often coupled with corruption
and inequitable distribution of the rents. Systems of patronage and clientelistic
relationships are the central operating scheme within the government with the emergence
of classic "Big Men,,17 arresting significant power through their usurpation of the state's
resource revenue. In such corrupt states, the rents from natural resource extraction and
sale are enjoyed only by elites groups in power with little wealth trickling down to
general populations.
Within the literature, scholars argue that abundance in natural resources acts as an
incentive and cause for the creation of corruption and patronage politics. The prospect of
capturing the significant rents generated from natural resources provides a viable
incentive for those in power to arrange systems where they are personally enriched by the
sales. Those in positions of power and influence within the state structure have a
reasonable motivation for structuring the financial systems of a state in such a way that
14 McSherry, 2006
15 Hootan Shambayati, "The Rentier State, Interest Groups and the Paradox of
Autonomy: State and Business in Turkey and Iran," Comparative Politics, 1994.
16 Michael Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" World Politics, 2001.
17 Todd J. Moss, African Development Making Sense OfThe Issues and Actors (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers: 2007).
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they are open to accessing funds derived from resource sales. This supposition is
supported by academic research including: Collier and Roeffler's arguments explaining
why resources tend to induce patronage politics, and Fearon and Laitin's conviction that
oil wealth leads to the development of weak state structures (and thus civil war). In order
to test the validity of these suggested theories, this study will apply variables indicating
levels of democracy, regime characteristics, and the presence of patronage behavior to
check whether they are relevant factors contributing to the onset of conflict in the sixteen
case studies.
Citizen Grievances and Secessionist Demands
Relating the themes of rentier state, patronage politics, and unresponsive
governments back to the issue of conflict onset, considerations of both greed and
grievance are valid. It may be argued that greed acts as the motivating force encouraging
state elites to develop the types of state structures easiest for them to abuse and
personally benefit from. The "greed" motivates them to arrange state systems where they
stand to benefit the most from the trade of natural resources. This form ofgreed variable
does not directly cause the outbreak of conflict, but instead creates the conditions for
grievances, which in turn, are capable of inciting conflict. Such grievances are likely to
arise out of the citizenry as they express their objection to the inequitable distribution of
rents, and the neglectful character of the state. States such as United Arab Emirates,
which are rich in oil resources, exist as exemplars of resource rent management.
Applying the financial benefits of their oil trade to socially responsible projects, the
overall population benefits, not just the lucky elite. It is in states which adopt poor rent
17
distribution methods that are more likely to experience conflict motivated by citizen
grievances.
To test for this type of conflict-inducing grievance, the presence of secessionist
interests in the sixteen case studies will be examined. Collier and Roeffler (2005), Le
Billon (2007), Fearon (2004), and Ross (2004) all have studied the high correlation
between natural resource wealth (they all point to the particular relevance of oil wealth in
such cases) and secessionist conflicts. The underlying logic explaining the connection
between resource wealth and secession based civil wars is founded in the concept of
grievances. As mentioned earlier, citizen grievances addressing the inequitable
distribution of resource rents contributes to the onset ofcivil conflict. In many situations,
the regions seeking secession are the areas rich in resources. Because ofpresumed
government corruption and population neglect, the citizens residing in those resource rich
areas are not necessarily benefitting from the extraction, and may even be consequently
negatively affected by the prolonged harvesting of the resources. IS Believing to have
inherent claims over the resources found in their local areas, populations are likely to
protest when their resources are extracted without receiving their conceived notion of fair
payment (which may include certain percentages of rents, more decision-making power
IS This type of scenario (discussed further in the "findings" section) - local populations
being negatively affected by resource extraction - is particularly relevant in areas
involved in oil production. Because oil production does not require many employees,
and most of the employees needed must have specialized training, local populations
rarely benefit from the oil industry bringing employment opportunities. Furthermore, oil
extraction is notorious for causing significant environmental damage (oil spills, leakages,
gas flares, etc.), which can cause serious health problems in local populations, as well as
destroy their environment's productive capacity to host fertile lands and waters (for
which many local populations, especially in undeveloped states, rely on for food and
employment).
18
over local resources, etc.). Such grievances may induce geographic communities to
engage in civil war with the state, the end goal being secession and autonomy. On the
other hand, the government has an obvious interest in keeping the region a part of its
state, because in the nature of a rentier state, it depends on the revenue generated from the
region's resource extraction and sale. Ifthe grievances ofcitizens' residing in resource-
rich areas are not met, it is likely that conflict will break out over the issue of resource
control and its resulting rents. To test the viability of the secession variable, each case
study will be checked for the presence of secessionist demands, and secession-motivated
rebel groups.
The issue ofcitizen grievances influencing the onset of conflict is supported by
various scholars. Le Billon (2001) has conducted research pointing to the role that
subjugated rights of populations plays in instigating grievance-based confliCt.19 Scholars
Collier and Roeffler, and Ron argue that poverty plays a big role in conflict, and can
serve as a grievance capable of rallying support for civil war.20 Weinstein adds an
interesting finding which asserts that, in conflicts with a strong resource element,
opportunistic rebel leaders (seeking power for the sake of resource rents) will often
crowd out, and replace ideological leaders (leaders perhaps more grounded in
grievances). This supports both a greed and grievance linkage between resources and
19 Phillippe Le Billon, "The political ecology of war: natural resources and armed
conflict," Political Geography, 2001.
20 Collier and Roeffler, 2004; Collier and Roeffler 2005; James Ron, "Paradigm in
Distress? Primary Commodities and Civil War," Journal ofConflict Resolution, 2005.
19
conflict?! Furthermore, anecdotal evidence from various case studies makes a strong case
for the relevance of other grievances directly resulting from oil industry activity. Oil
production causing environmental degradation, lack of access to traditional lands and
waters, and other such occurrences directly affects local populations, and therefore have
the potential to act as a rallying community grievance attacking both oil companies and
production groups, as well as the national government condoning the deleterious
extraction. It seems that the types of grievances capable of motivating conflict may be
divided into two separate spheres: (1) dissatisfaction with government performance and
rent distribution, and (2) protest against the effects (and/or non-effects) communities
endure as results of resource extraction operations. To test whether or not these
grievances playa strong role in inciting the onset of conflict, this study will examine
variables concerned with poverty rates, unemployment rates, and the stated demands and
propaganda of the mobilized armed opposition groups.
Conflict Duration Arguments
In addition to the arguments supporting the position that the oil natural resource
can act as a catalyst capable of contributing to the onset of conflict, another area of
literature presents a set of theories arguing the potential role oil serves as a variable
capable of affecting the length and duration of a conflict. The general notion guiding this
type of resource conflict literature is that because oil is a valuable, and strategically in-
demand commodity resource, it can be sold for significant amounts of money, generating
considerable rents. Whoever is capable of accessing those oil rents, theoretically, has at
2! J.M. Weinstein. Inside Rebellion: The Politics ofInsurgent Violence (Cambridge UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2007).
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their disposal considerable amounts ofwealth.22 In terms of conflict studies, it is argued
that that generated wealth is often used to finance and outfit armed groups, whether they
be a national military or an organized rebel group. Although this concept captures the
overall sentiment construing oil as an entity capable of lengthening conflict, the specific
ways in which it can be used as a financing tool differs. Scholars Ross (1999), Collier
and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon (2004), Le Billon (2001), and Humphreys (2005) all present
arguments supporting the notion that natural resources can influence the duration of
conflicts. The two main ways oil can influence the duration of a conflict is: (1) when oil
rents are used to fund armed groups (includes financial support for operations, procuring
arms and weapons, providing necessities and viable opportunities for soldiers, belonging
to either the recognized state military or a belligerent opposition group), (2) or when oil is
auctioned as a "booty future."
The Lootability ofNatural Resources and State Military Spending
Supporting the argument that natural resources may be used to fund conflict,
scholars such as Fearon, Ross, and Le Billon present evidence of situations when
"looted" resources were procured and sold in order to fund armed groups. Perhaps the
most recognized situations of this type of resource dynamic has been documented in
examples related to narcotics and gems such as diamonds. It has been well-documented
that groups such as FARC in Colombia and the Taliban in Afghanistan have generated
22 Furthermore, because oil is so valuable and such an internationally demanded resource,
it is likely that rents will continue to enrich whoever controls or "owns" the rights to the
oil as it is consistently pumped, produced, and exported over several years (or until the
oil field's yield is exhausted). Oil is then perceived, in the short term, as a viable form of
reliable income and not simply a one time sale.
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significant amounts of revenue from their controlled production and sale of cocaine,
opium, and heroin. Furthermore, the public has become well-familiarized with the notion
of a "blood diamond" and the way groups in conflict states such as Sierra Leone, Liberia,
and Angola seized control of the diamond mining industry, and co-opted all rents
generated through the sale of the gems. It is believed that without the revenue generated
from such sales, these groups would not be able to sustain their movements due to a lack
offmancial resources (the thinking is that the groups rely on shadow economies, and
would not be able to replace the revenue derived from such activities through legitimate
industries).
This pattern of resource-funded civil wars has been well-documented in the
resource conflict literature outside of the oil realm. Despite the strong arguments
constructed by the concepts pointing to the ability of resources to fuel conflicts (such as
"blood diamonds," "conflict timber" and illegal narcotics), some argue that oil may not
serve similar ends as it is a much more difficult product to "loot" and trade as contraband.
Ross presents logical arguments negating the notion that oil can be manipulated in such a
way during situations ofconflict. This study seeks to establish whether or not oil can also
be considered a lootable resource and capable of financially sustaining rebel groups
outside of the legitimate state economy. The "lootability" of oil is applied to the sixteen
case study data set, checking for its causal validity.
Further elaborating on the notion that resource rents may contribute to the
financial viability of an armed group, a related variable will be included in this portion of
the study's test. This variable will explore the hypothesis that states will use wealth
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generated from resource rents to fund and strengthen their state militaries. The reasoning
is that governing bodies in control of states, especially states that have nationalized
resource industries, will not skimp on funds contributed to their militaries, as these anned
entities will theoretically serve the needs and interests of the presiding government
administration. Strong militaries can be used to maintain security and swiftly defeat any
threat posed by opposition or rebel groups wishing to dethrone or replace the residing
government. Military spending will be adopted as a variable and applied to the sixteen
states included in the study in hopes that it will shed light on the ways resource-rich states
navigate the distribution and spending of their oil rents.
The "Booty Futures" Variable
Another test variable born from the existing resource conflict literature represents
the notion of "booty futures." The term was coined by scholar Michael Ross who saw
"booty futures," or the selling of future exploitation rights of natural resources, as a
variable capable of contributing to the duration of conflict.23 In these types of situations,
owners and controllers of a resource (generally the state) will sell the future rights of that
resource source to a buyer.24 This type of situation, the auctioning off of future extractive
rights, is commonly practiced in the oil industry as oil fields are divided into blocks and
sold to the highest bidder. Depending on the specifications of the agreement the highest
23 Michael Ross, "Booty Futures: Africa's Civil Wars and the Future Markets for Natural
Resources," American Political Science Association, 2005.
24 Some instances have actually seen belligerent bodies such as rebel groups succeed in
selling their own "booty futures." Selling the rights and access to diamond mines and
mineral mines, rebel groups have been able to deepen their coffers, and thus sustain their
movement.
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bidder wins the rights to explore, extract, produce, and sell the derived natural resource.
In situations of conflict, the work ofRoss and Humphreys reveals that the sale of "booty
futures" and "prospectives,,25 can play similar roles as lootable resources - they generate
significant levels of revenue which in turn are used to finance one side of a conflict. In
most situations, the state sells the booty futures and receives a financial windfall. Instead
of putting the revenue towards development, debt alleviation, or social services, the
money will go towards supporting the state military engaged in civil war with an armed
opposition group. Depending on the level of fmancing available to the opposition group,
the influx of wealth at the disposal of the military will theoretically be enough to
overwhelm and squelch the security threat posed by the opposition group. In this type of
situation, the booty futures will contribute to an end to the conflict, as the state military
will overwhelm and "beat" the insurgency. This kind of resolution would only occur if
the opposition had little access to effective funding. Bennett and Starn theorized that
conflicts involving two sides with equal access to resources last longer than those with
lopsided opponents.26 This notion of "booty futures" will be applied to the data set as a
way ofchecking for its role in extending the length of conflict. Supposing that Bennett
and Starn's notions are correct, that conflicts involving sides with equal access to
resources will last longer, I will test the hypothesis that the sale of booty futures
contributes to the "evening" out of resource access on the part of the state, raising its
25 Macartan Humphreys, "Natural Resources, Conflict and Conflict Resolution:
Uncovering the Mechanisms," Journal ofConflict Resolution, 2005.
26 D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Starn III, "The Declining Advantages ofDemocracy: A
Combined Model of War Outcomes and Duration," The Journal ofConflict Resolution,
2000.
available wealth to levels similar to the rebel group, and thus contributing to the





The methodology employed in this study is steeped in the qualitative
comparative analysis technique. Specifically, this test is structured around methods of
within-case analysis. Through this process, the value of large-n statistical studies is
married with the value of individual case studies for a richer, more conclusive, and more
relevant examination. Each of the sixteen selected case studies were treated as an
individual case study and analyzed as such. Investigation of each case study drew out the
valuable specifics and details providing a rich qualitative understanding of each situation
of conflict. Upon focusing on the case studies as independent entities, each set of
findings were then compared with each other, checking for within-case commonalities
and trends. Using process-tracing techniques and variable testing, the within-case
analysis revealed which elements were significant and common within the data set ofoil
conflicts, and could therefore be considered as causally valid factors. Recognizing that
the overall purpose of this study is to identify commonalities between oil-related civil
wars, this method is well-suited and provides the opportunity to fmd relevant patterns and
variables able to contribute valuable explanatory insights. Within-case analysis is an
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effective methodology to have chosen because it is an appropriate system to use when
examining like cases?7
Guided by the research question, how does oil affect the onset and duration of
civil war? the first step ofdeveloping the research system was to identify where, and in
what situations both civil war and the influence of oil could be accounted for. In the past,
studies examining the elements and circumstances ofresource conflict have largely
employed large-n statistical quantitative methods, or focused single case-study analysis.
Each type of study has contributed valuable ideas, variables, hypotheses, and theories to
the overall resource conflict literature, but also tend to fail in their ability to have certain
cross-case explanatory power. Large-scale statistical studies tend to fmd correlations, but
often lack the conditional and circumstantial evidence to imply meaningful results and
findings. On the other end of the spectrum, small, individualized case studies are
effective in providing specific analysis of one instance of resource conflict, but the results
and findings of that one case may not be applicable or relevant to any other cases. For
this reason, a mid-level case study analysis was chosen as the preferred methodological
structure in hopes that it may be able to circumvent the problems experienced in the other
systems.
Intending to provide an all-encompassing review of oil-related civil wars, the
case selection process for this study includes all situations of civil wars in countries
27 In within-case studies, "non-cases" are not necessary to include. In this case, non-
cases might include states such as the United States, Canada, United Arab Emirates,
Kuwait, Mexico, or Australia - states rich in oil, but have not experienced civil conflict
within the given timeframe. A further discussion on "non-cases" and their lack of
necessity in this study is provided at the end of the section.
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where oil is extracted. These two factors - the presence of civil war, and the presence of
oil extraction - are necessary to account for in order to accurately test whether or not a
situation of conflict is a result of a "resource curse." In other words, a situation of
"resource conflict" necessitates that there actually be both a conflict, and a resource. The
sixteen case studies selected for this study were based on these qualifications.
In 2001, Collier and Hoeffier developed a data set of civil wars for their own
research on resource conflict. Drawing from the CollierlHoeffler list, in 2004 Ross
developed another specified list of resource conflict related civil wars on which he
conducted his own study. Building off of these established data sets, and complemented
by the International Peace Research Institute's Conflict Database and the Center for the
Study of Civil War's data set of armed conflicts, I comprised an updated list of civil
wars.
Upon establishing a list of civil wars, the oil variable was then considered, which
led to a significant decrease in applicable civil wars. Comparing the constructed list of
civil wars to a list of all states with proven oil reserves, functioning oil extraction and
production activities, and/or exporting oil, every state accounted for in each list was
placed in the study's data set. Cross-listing states with an occurrence of civil war, as well
as an occurrence of possessing oil resources resulted in a list of sixteen states from
around the world. Accounting for both situations of civil war, and involvement in the oil
industry, these states are all suitable for cross-case comparison to test a range ofvariables
for instances of causal validity.
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This method of case selection accounts for the two major components of the area
this study intends to examine: a "resource" (oil), and a "curse" (civil war). Admittedly,
following this system of case selection results in both methodological strengths and
weaknesses. The study benefits from a lack of case selection bias, the consideration of
diverse and wide-ranging cases from around the world, and comprehensively covers a
whole sector of data. Because the lists used for compiling the civil war data, and the oil
data comprehensively covered all instances of civil war and oil possession, and the data
set includes all of the case studies registered in both lists, there was no opportunity to
pick and choose the cases involved in the study. All cases were considered equally with
variables applied to each uniformly regardless ofwhether or not they served the study's
hypothesized results. Using this type ofuniversal selection (and lacking bias), cases were
not included because they fit easily into an expected resource conflict model, but because
they happened to possess the two prerequisite conditions: oil, and civil war.
A second valuable product of the methodological case selection process resulted
in the international relevance of the study's findings and analyses. The systematic case
selection process resulted in a list of states from around the world. Not only does this
provide geographical and regional variety, but it also provides a data set enriched with a
variety ofcultures, religions, governing systems, etc. This variation creates the potential
for strong, far-reaching results. For instance, because instances of hydrocarbon sector
nationalization occurred within most of the case studies - from Southeast Asia, to Sub-
Saharan Africa, to the Middle East, and South America - and not just in one region, the
argument that the "nationalization variable" is a relevant influence in oil resource
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conflicts is strengthened as less consideration is given to the possibility of intervening
variables or a region-specific explanation.
Despite these positive elements, there is also room for criticism that the study is
weakened by a lack of congruity and "control" between the selected case studies, and the
omission and unaccounted consideration of instances where a state's wealth in oil does
not result in civil war. Although the international variety of case studies can be perceived
as a strength of the study (in that the fmdings may be relevant for an array of regions), it
may also work to weaken its explanatory power. While the cases are similar in the fact
that they share common occurrences of civil war and oil production, other state
characteristics are very different. The military junta ruling in Burma is very different
from the governing body operating in Colombia, the people of Angola practice very
different religious practices than the people of Yemen, and the populations residing in
Azerbaijan have a very different history than the populations residing in Peru. Religion,
ethnicity, politics, economic factors, history, and a host of other factors serve as
distinguishing variables making each case study very different from the others included
in the data set. Because all of these other elements are involved in shaping the realities of
individual states, it is difficult to isolate the oil variable as the principle causal agent
contributing to the onset or length of a conflict. Many valid arguments have posited
ethnicity, religion, authoritarian rule, social grievances, etc. as catalysts and motivators
for the onset of armed conflict. It is not the intention of this study to refute such fmdings
or argue that oil and natural resources are the sole causal agent capable of instigating
conflict. Respectfully, the individual character - its populations' religion, shared
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histories, cultures, political consciences, economic traditions, etc. - of each state and case
study is considered in analyzing the onset and duration of each conflict. The oil variable
only serves as one possible factor, operating within multifaceted state environments, that
was tested to reveal how it mayor may not play an active role in the onset and duration
of armed conflict. Believing that the oil variable is significant in conflict situations, and
perhaps even more so than ethnicity and religion, each case study was examined in such a
way to dissect its causal elements. Could a conflict marred by seeming ethnic tension,
really simply be a conflict over resources in which leaders have politicized and mobilized
support around ethnic communities? Why would religious communities who had
previously cohabited peacefully or even cohabited with histories of animosity choose at
one specific time to fight one another? Could religious groups' interest in oil and any
correlative power gained by its control have anything to do with an outbreak of
"religious" conflict? Such questions were asked throughout each case analysis to
uncover how, what, and why oil played a role in affecting the outbreak and duration of
conflict. Because armed conflicts are often complicated by many actors, many interests,
and many situational conditions, it would seem naive to place all causal responsibility on
a single variable, such as oil. Therefore, this study does not argue that the oil variable is
the end all, be all of conflict indicators. Its intention is to investigate the role, however
significant or slight, that the oil resource plays in civil wars.
A further criticism capable of weakening the study's findings is that case studies
such as Norway, the United States, Canada, and United Arab Emirates, are unaccounted
for. Hypothesizing that the presence of oil in a state will increase the likelihood of
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conflict, the inclusion of states that are rich in oil and lack situations of armed conflict
admittedly might add methodological balance to the study. By examining situations
where oil did contribute to conflict, and situations where oil failed to contribute to
conflict, one might be able to more easily identify significant, causal variables, rigorously
test them, leading to highly legitimate fmdings. Although valuable, this type of analysis
is beyond the scope of this study, but may be a very constructive area of examination for
future research.
This test is structured around within-case analysis. Applying methods ofprocess
tracing searching for the causal validity ofthe given variables, it is important that the
cases are similar enough to be able to compare so that the findings are relevant. In order
to avoid a situation similar to comparing "apples and oranges," case studies such as the
United States, Norway, and Canada were left out of study because, (1) they experienced
no instances of conflict, and (2) have very qualitatively different societal, structural,
political, and economic make-ups than the sixteen states included in this test. In all
likelihood, those societal, structural, political, and economic structures have very much to
do with why the sixteen included case studies have experienced conflict, and the variable
findings included in this study support such a notion. Furthermore, while looking at the
overall list ofoil-rich states, it is easy to delineate between state "types." The United
States, Norway, and United Arab Emirates enjoy much higher levels of GDP per capita,
are included in the list of top 30 highest ranking states in the Human Development Index
(United Nations Development Program), and have experienced many years of political
stability. Another factor dividing the peaceful oil-producing states from the conflict-
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ridden oil-producing states is colonial histories. The United States, Norway, Mexico,
Venezuela, Australia, and Brazil were unoccupied by colonizers and imperialists during
the twentieth century, when oil was realized as the valued commodity it is today. It
seems that these factors might serve as plausible variables contributing to the differing
fates of oil-producing states, and may be valuable for future study. However, in this
within-case analysis, the sixteen included states were included in order to shed light on
the shared characteristics exhibited by these states in efforts to uncover the conditional
characteristics of conflict-prone oil-producing states. It is therefore unproductive for this
test to include all oil-exporting countries as specific value is gained from the analysis of
this closed data set.
Why Oil?
As previously noted, the resource conflict body of research includes the study of
several types of resources. Whether it be "blood diamonds" in Sierra Leone, timber in
Cambodia, mineral cohan in the Democratic Republic of Congo, narcotics in
Afghanistan, water in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories,28 or of course the
example of oil in the sixteen case studies of this work, an undeniable connection has been
established between natural resources and conflict. If so many types of natural resources
are relevant, why does this study focus only on oil? There are three main reasons why oil
was selected as the main conflict-related natural resource to focus on - an economic
reason, a political reason, and a methodological reason.
28 The term "Occupied Palestinian Territories" is the preferred term adopted by the
United Nations, and for this reason, is referred to as such in this study.
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Methodologically, many of the previously conducted studies focus on a
generalized topic ofnatural resources - copper, heroin, timber, water, gems, etc. These
studies have provided valuable insights into the relationship between natural resources
and conflict, but are mostly broad and generalized. Although diamonds, water, oil,
minerals, and narcotics are all natural resources of value (whether that value be a
socially-constructed monetized worth like diamonds, or a value related to vital life-
support such as water) and share similarities due to their connection to natural
environments,29 because their physical and social nature is very different, they may have
differing effects and play differing roles in a conflict setting. For instance, in the
conflicts which diamonds are used as a funding mechanism for rebel groups, the item of
value (i.e.: diamond) is very small, but worth very much proportionate to its actual size or
weight. Because of its ability to be easily hidden and remain inconspicuously out of
view, diamonds may very easily be ferried in and out of conflict areas to buyers and
financiers. Consider then a barrel of oil - the most easily, and common form of transport
container for this liquid resource. Whereas a single carat diamond can be as small as a
pencil-top eraser and worth an average $2,000-$3,50030 (USD), one would need about 37
barrels of oil priced at $80 USD (note: a common 42 gallon barrel of crude oil weighs
29 One major argument in the natural resource literature is that natural resources have the
potential to play specific roles in some conflicts because of their nature as a "point"
resource. This means that the resource is fixed, and geographic-specific, therefore a
conflict with a natural resource element to it is often confmed to whichever general area
that resource is located. Unlike an industrial factory able to generate wealth wherever it
is chosen to be built, it is impossible to "relocate" an oil field away from its original place
to a seemingly more secure or convenient area.
30 The price estimate is based off of the information found on "The Diamond Buying
Guide" <http://www.thediamondbuyingguide.com/diamondpriceguide.html#500>
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roughly 306 pounds) to equal the value of the single diamond. Because of this factor,
diamonds are obviously much easier than barrels of oil to inconspicuously transport
legally or illegally. The above noted variable, ease of resource transport, is only one
example of the serious weaknesses present in using a diverse range of resource types
when trying to account for their effects and potential roles in conflict. Although by
limiting the scope of this study to the examination of oil only, it narrows the apparent
applicability of the findings to a smaller number of conflicts, it creates the potential to
provide specialized analysis, more suitable to provide useful information for more
effective understanding, policy creation, or conflict resolution of oil-specific conflicts.
Furthermore, the trends and variables that are found to be relevant in oil conflicts, may
also prove to be relevant in other resource conflicts but with perhaps slightly varied
specifications, and therefore this oil-specific study contributes valuable insights to the
overall area study.
Besides methodological reasons, this study focuses solely on oil because of this
natural resource's political and economic significance. For economic considerations, oil
is a hugely valuable commodity. As noted above, yes, perhaps diamonds are capable of
generating more wealth relative to their size, but oil is generally found in much greater
quantities. Where an alluvial diamond mine may produce x-amount of diamonds resulting
in x-amount of generated wealth, oil fields fill far, far greater expanses and have the
potential for extracting many more billions of dollars worth of commodified wealth.31
31 This argument is based on very basic principles recognizing that diamonds fields tend
to be confined to smaller areas on land with the resource scattered throughout those
confmed acres, and oil tends to be dwell in huge "fields" of several million to billion
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The international oil economy generates billions of dollars annually, and international oil
companies are amongst the most wealthy and profitable economic enterprises as
evidenced by the fact that Exxon-Mobil, Chevron, and ConocoPhillips are, respectively,
the world's top three net income earning companies generating over a combined $93
billion in 2008.32 Because of political and economic state structuring, the multinational
corporations extracting, exporting, trading, and selling the oil are not the only big
financial winners - the countries in which the oil is found also generates significant
amounts of money through oil production.33 Revealing the financial potential available
to states very wealthy in hydrocarbon resources, states like Qatar, United Arab Emirates,
and Kuwait can significantly stabilize, strengthen, and enrich their state economies and
citizens' living conditions through oil-generated wealth. Relative to resource conflict
theoretical perspectives, because oil is such a valuable resource particularly capable of
generating so much wealth, control of the industry and its rents emerges as a highly
lucrative and attractive enterprise for any actor or group powerful enough to attain it
(legitimately powerful, or illegitimately powerful). The possibility of controlling a state
or region rich in oil provides a huge incentive for any governing body whether it be a
gallons full of proven resources. The argument may be complicated by the relevance of
peak oil considerations, or the fact that diamonds may be used again and again (in
multiple jewelry forms, multiple sales, etc.) resembling a renewable resource, while a
gallon of oil be used only once as a truly non-renewable resource, etc.
32 According to Forbes List 2008
<http://www.forbes.com/listsI2009/88/bigcompanies08 The-400-Best-Big-
Companies NetInc.html>
33 Such financial rewards may come in the form of Production Sharing Agreements,
50/50 revenue share agreements, nationalization schemes, the leasing of access to
resource sources, etc.
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recognized state government, a mobilized armed rebel group, or a business consortium.
This type of economic consideration complements the resource conflict "rebel greed
theory.,,34 The economic incentive is particularly strong in oil conflicts - arguably more
so than in conflicts set around trade in diamonds, timber, or water - and thus serves as a
relevant resource to focus on. To select oil as the principle resource makes sense in
economic considerations, but this resource also holds considerable political clout. Its
pertinence as a political entity is of equal importance in considering the significance of
this particular natural resource, as well as the necessity for quality scholarship on its role
and influence in international affairs.
Political considerations further support the reason for choosing oil as the focus of
this study on resource conflict. Not only has oil become a significant driver and
necessary ingredient for so many economies around the world (both as a source of
generated income through its production and sale, as well as a requisite element as a
source ofenergy in the functioning of nearly all sectors ofan economy), but it has also
become intricately connected to national security strategies. Since World War II the
world, and especially the world's leaders, have become increasingly dependent upon oil
as a source of energy.35
As exemplified by the United States, more and more countries around the world
have become dependent on oil as their primary form ofenergy. Because of this reliance,
oil considerations have become intricately connected to the United States national
security strategy. Enjoying a long history of securely accessing cheap supplies ofoil to
34 Collier and Roeffler, 2004
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run industrial activities, fuel cars, heat homes, etc., situations such as the Suez Crisis,36
and the implementation of the "oil weapon" in the 1980s37 catalyzed worries of how oil
could significantly affect situations of national security, stability, and prosperity. Perhaps
in response to the growing concern of American reliance on foreign resources, since the
1980s, the United States has adopted energy issues as issues of the "National Security
Interest" (Klare, 2002). The year 1991 saw the United States' military intervention in the
Persian Gulf, spurring many to believe that such forceful actions were taken in order to
secure American access to the vital supplies of oil found within the region (and at
preferred conditions of access and pricing from Kuwait).38 In 2000, Condoleeza Rice (at
the time was a foreign policy adviser to George W. Bush during his campaign as the
Republican presidential candidate for President) suggested that oil, as the dominant form
of American energy, should be considered within the parameters of the United States'
"national interest.,,39 Furthering this sentiment, within the text of the White House issued,
36 In brief, the Suez Canal Crisis revealed the significance of oil, and industrial nations'
access to it. In an attempt to nationalize the British-owned Suez Canal, Egypt created a
conflict which resulted in the inability for oil tankers to pass through the canal, thus
cutting off oil supplies to Europe. This interruption in oil supplies revealed the true
dependence the industrial world has on oil and access to cheap and steady supplies of it.
37 The oil weapon, in essence, can be thought of as an economic leverage oil producing
states have over oil consuming states. Because oil. consuming states need the resources
provided them cheaply from oil producers, they have become somewhat reliant on
consistent flows. Should oil producing states choose to disrupt the flow of oil, reduce the
flow of oil, or raise the price of their oil, they hold significant power over the consuming
states - power which is likened to the threat of a weapon.
38 Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, The Gulf War Reader History, Documents,
Opinions (New York: Random House, 1991).
39 Foreign Affairs, "Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest"
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energy security" was included as a primary focus of the Bush administration, as well as a
greater commitment to fostering deeper economic, political, and aid-related relationships
with Sub-Saharan Africa, a region which was to become the United States' leading
supplier of foreign oil only a few years later.4o In recent years, rhetoric concerning,
American reliance on foreign oil, a lack of energy independence, and the economic
shocks ofsky-rocketing fuel prices all point to the relevance oil plays within the
American political scene. During the Cold War, most of the national security debates
seemed to revolve around concerns over nuclear issues, communist threats, etc. It seems
that in the new millennium, oil has been added as a new, primary matter of national
security. Because of the political and strategic significance this resource plays not only
in the American reality, but also in the realities of both developed and developing
countries around the world, oil is a particularly relevant and necessary natural resource to
study and gain insight on. Upon making a case for choosing oil as a relevant natural
resource worthy ofparticular examination, the findings of this study will be discussed.
40 "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America" September 2002,
also reference for US oil trade with Sub-Saharan Mrica surpassing the trade figures with
the Middle East in 2006.
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CHAPTER V
STUDY FINDINGS AND RESULTS
In review, the variables tested for in this qualitative study are: 1) oil as a primary
export commodity, 2) levels of democracy and governance systems, 3) citizens'
grievances, 4) oil treated as a looted resource used to fund armed groups and, 5) future oil
rights sold as "booty futures." As an overall and general finding, this study argues that
oil does indeed play an influential role in contributing to the conditions lending to
conflict onset and duration. Below is a table complete with a full review of the data
collected for this study. The table reveals a compressed form of the information and
variables tested for in this study. To better explain and elaborate upon the information
provided in the table, the following sections discuss the fmdings derived from the tested
variables reveal the specifics of oil's role in conflict settings.
TABLE 1
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Using within-case research, the above findings have been established for each
variable. Relying on historic accounts and timely news bits from other scholars and
researchers, an in-depth understanding of the pertinent elements of each situation of oil
conflict has been achieved. Paying particular attention to the variables included in this
study (oil export percentages, citizen grievances, oillootability factors, governance, and
booty futures), this study's gathered data derived from both qualitative historic accounts
and quantitative statistical reports, has shed light on the way oil influences the onset and
duration ofconflict.
The data included above is the basis for the findings and conclusions which will
be discussed further. Although each variable will be discussed in greater detail in the
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proceeding sections, a brief introduction to the findings of this analysis will underscore
the primary take-away points of the study. Addressing the notion of greed and grievance
as active causal influences in the realm of conflict, the findings derived from this study
point to the significance of each. As evidenced by the data collected from the sixteen case
studies, it appears that both greed and grievance led to the outbreak of sustained conflicts.
Ofnote however, is that the strongest evidence pointed to connections between governing
bodies and greed, while rebel groups were associated more often with grievance
elements. In essence, a common trend throughout the case studies showed that governing
bodies' actions were often marked by greedy motivations - their consolidation of power
over the state and oil industries, their corrupt practices of enriching themselves personally
through state oil rents, etc. On the other hand, the rebel groups opposing the state
governing body were often motivated to take arms due to oil-related grievances. Such
grievances include: poverty in oil-rich regions, inequitable access to oil rents, etc. In a
sort of symbiotic relationship, it seems that governing bodies' greed caused the
citizens'/rebeis' responding grievances, which eventually led to civil conflict between the
two parties.
This study examined the role of five main variables in their connection to oil
conflict onset and duration. Following analysis, it was found that citizen grievances, state
governing systems, and oil as a primary export commodity all played contributing roles
in the outbreak of conflict. Of the sixteen case studies examined, twelve of the states
showed a reliance on oil as its primary commodity export (Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan,
Burma, Chad, Colombia, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Russia, Sudan, and Yemen all produced
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figures revealing that oil exports contributed at least 20% or more to their national GDP).
I argue that this factor is relevant because it contributes to the conditions leading to
conflict. National GDP percentages are not necessarily a contentious point instigating
opposition, but rather it creates an economic environment where the natural resource
industry is seen as one of the only stable, profitable, and viable industries in a given state.
A reliance on sector of an economy can contribute to weakness and insecurity in other
sectors, thus states with a strong resource industry will attract people to that one area.
With more attraction to the resource industry, competition will heighten, and without
viable options in other economic sectors, that competition may heighten to such a degree
that people will be willing to engage in armed conflict in order to establish their
preferential access. Within this case study, Angola (oil accounts for 85% ofGDP) and
Azerbaijan (oil accounts for 90% of GDP) are amongst the strongest examples.
The second and third variables found to be relevant in contributing to the outbreak
of conflict are very much connected to the greed and grievance influences mentioned
above - citizen grievances and governance systems. Like the primary export variable,
governance systems did not so much serve as the point of contention in the conflict, but
contributed to the conditions leading to the outbreak of conflict. The oil-rich, conflict-
ridden states examined in this study shared many qualities in government structures. Ten
of the sixteen states were considered to be "authoritarian regimes" (Algeria, Angola,
Azerbaijan, Burma, Chad, Indonesia, Iraq, Nigeria, Sudan, and Yemen), and not a single
case study earned recognition as a fimctioning democracy. I argue that this lack of
democratic practice within the examined states contributed to the outbreak of conflict as
48
citizens and opposition groups were forced to state their claims through armed aggression
as they were afforded no other option (ie: political activism, political lobbying, effective
social movements, etc.). Furthermore patronage systems, present in thirteen of the
sixteen case studies (Angola, Azerbaijan, Burma, Chad, Colombia, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Russia, and Sudan) proved to be another significant way in
which governing bodies abused their control over the oil industry, and thus contributed to
opposition outcry and conflict. These greed-inspired actions of the states, in part,
inspired opposition groups and the relevance ofcitizen grievances as a contributing
element influencing the outbreak: ofconflict.
The citizen grievance variable provided the strongest arguments answering the
question ofwhy conflict broke out in the oil-rich states. The type of expressed citizen
grievances in the examined oil-related conflicts included: issues over poverty and
unemployment in oil-rich areas, lack of community access and control over oil resources,
environmental degradation, and the resulting blame put on the authorities responsible for
the oil operations. Although all of those grievances contributed to the outbreak: of
conflict, it seemed that the most relevant form of grievance, most capable of causing
conflict, was when citizens' livelihoods and abilities to access viable forms of
employment and self-sufficiency were impeded or eliminated as a direct result ofoil
operations in their region. The Niger Delta case study provides an ideal example ofhow
oil extraction operations destroyed their traditional employment and livelihood practices
(through severe environmental degradation, displacement, and rampant poverty).
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Another significant element of the citizen grievance findings addresses the nature
of oil conflicts. Along with issues of employment and poverty in oil-producing regions,
another salient grievance common in many of the conflicts examined in the data set is
related to a lack of resource community control. Believing they had little to no say in the
way their regions' resources were exploited and the resulting rents spent, many
communities engaged in a secessionist-based conflict against the main state. Ten of the
sixteen case studies included citizen grievances resulting in armed movements for
secession, and the creation of an independent oil-rich entity, separate from the pariah
state (secession movements in oil-rich regions occurred in: Angola!Cabinda;
Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh; Burma!Karen/Kachin/Arakan; Georgia!Abkhazia!South
Ossetia; Indonesia!Aceh/Java!West Papua/South Molucca;
IranlKurdistan!Assyria!Arabistan; Iraq/Kurds; Nigeria/Biafra/Niger Delta;
Russia!Chechnya; Sudan/Southern Sudan; and Yemen/South Yemen/Sa'ada!Aden).
The second set of variables examined in this study, analyzed the role that oil
played in affecting the duration of conflict. The lootability variable and booty futures
variable were not as common of influences as the onset-related variables in oil-related
conflicts, but when they were present, did significantly change the course of the conflict.
Addressing the lootability factor, it was found that rebel groups rarely looted oil
resources as a tool of funding. Only six of the sixteen case studies included situations
where rebel groups were fmancially strengthened by oil-related revenues. Bunkering, a
system of siphoning oil resources from operating pipelines, only proved to be significant
in one case study - the Nigerian Niger Delta conflict. Other than that, some rebel groups
,------------ - - - -- ------
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used extortion and kidnapping techniques to financially gain from the operating oil
industry (Colombia, Indonesia, Nigeria, Peru, and Sudan). Although the practice of oil
looting was not a common theme throughout the case studies, it should not be discounted
as a relevant feature ofoil conflict as it significantly contributed to the economic
relevance and sustainability of the rebel groups. Through looting techniques, the rebel
groups in the six conflict examples were able to sustain their movements, and thus extend
the length of the armed conflicts.
Although the lootability factor was not a particularly common trend amongst
rebel groups, it was found that the state governments commonly "looted" the oil rents
from national coffers, and distributed them to state militaries. Using money generated
through nationalized oil industries, many of the state governments expended significant
portions of their state GDPs to resourcing efforts for their state militaries. An interesting
finding is that, because the governments spent enough to make the military a viable force,
armed opposition groups were presented with a resourced opponent. However, because
the states did not spend enough on their militaries, opposition groups were capable of
mounting effective attacks (as the groups were more less equal in available resources and
capacity). This neutralization of force strength between the state militaries and the rebel
groups resulted in lengthened conflicts.
Similar to the lootability findings, the booty futures variable was not a common
trend prevalent throughout the sixteen case studies. Only four of the sixteen conflicts
(Angola, Azerbaijan, Chad, and Sudan) were influenced by booty futures. Also, like the
lootability variable, it is important to note that simply because booty futures were not
51
prevalent in many of the examined conflicts, it does not negate its significance as a
possible influence in oil-related wars. As described later in the study, booty futures
played an integral part in determining both the length and the ultimate victor in Angola's
second civil war.
Oil Discovery Dates and Timeline Relevance ofResource Conflicts
Before the various variables were applied to the case studies, an initial
examination of the states' historic timelines was necessary. The purpose of the study is
to uncover and identify the potential role and influence oil has on conflict. To check for a
connection between oil and conflict, oil needs to be a present factor and consideration in
the state. In order to test for the possibility for an oil influence, oil had to have been
discovered within the borders of the state in question. Comparing the dates in which oil
was discovered in the sixteen states with the dates marking the outbreak of civil war, I
was able to provide initial assurance, that there indeed existed the possibility for an oil
influence in each conflict. Although this method oftimeline comparison is incapable of
determining whether or not oil actually influenced the onset or duration of the conflict, it
does provide the validation that because oil was known to exist within the state, it had the
potential to influence the conditions of conflict. Every state, with the exception of three
states experienced oil discovery before experiencing any situations of civil conflict [see
appendix]. The three case studies not easily fitting into the oil first, conflict second
timeline ramifications are Chad, the Sudan, and Yemen, but this does not negate the
possibility of oil playing a partial influencing role in some of the states' conflicts.
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The case study of Chad does not fit easily into the timeline argument only because
of production and extraction of the state's oil reserves only occurred when the state's
civil wars had been brought to an end. In one regard, Chad fits into the stated necessary
conditions of oil discovery preceding conflict outbreak as the natural resource was
discovered under the state's surface in the 1960s, well before the first bout of official war
broke out in 1980. Where Chad differs from the other case studies is that oil was never
extracted from the country's known reserves until 2003, after both civil wars had ended.
One might argue that because oil was never actually produced and turned into a valuable
commodity, it could not serve as a traditional variable affecting greed or grievances
arguments for conflict onset and duration. Although oil cannot be "looted," governing
bodies cannot use its rents to equip and strengthen state militaries, and it may not be
factored into state GDP percentages, there is the possibility for the prospect of oil
revenue to affect the conflict. Despite knowing valuable oil existed in Chad,
multinational oil companies were reluctant to invest in the unstable country because of
the looming threat that conflict and civil unrest would disrupt the extractive process.
Although very profitable in the end, oil production is very front heavy in
investment needs. The initial cost of exploration and infrastructure build-up in the oil
extraction industry is quite expensive, and the risk that oil production may be disrupted
by insecure conditions within the state proved too great a risk for possible investors in
Chad. Considering the fact that security concerns were the most significant impediment
to the generation of oil wealth in Chad, state actors had an incentive to resolve Chad's
conflicts, establish a semblance of order and security, and thus create conditions
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welcoming to foreign oil investment and the generation of resource rents. In this way,
the prospect of oil wealth may have played a role in affecting the duration of the state's
conflict by bringing an end to it.
The remaining two outliers in the timeline analysis do not fit easily into the model
because they both experienced initial conflicts before the discovery of oil was made. In
the Sudan, the first civil war occurred between the years of 1963 and 1972. Oil could not
have played a role in this first conflict as oil was not discovered in the southern region of
the state until 1979.41 The second instance of civil war beginning around 1983 and
lasting through to present times, serves as a potential example ofoil influenced conflict
due to its onset following the discovery of oil. A similar stipulation may be applied to the
Yemen case. The fIrst situation ofconflict within the state occurred between 1962 and
1969 which preceded the 1984 discovery of oil in the state. Although oil could not have
played a role in Yemen's fIrst conflict, it has the potential to influence the state's
conflicts occurring in the years: 1986, 1990-1994, and 2004-present day.
Conflict Onset Findings
The following section includes analysis and discussion of the proposed variables linked
to the onset of conflict.
Primary Commodity Export Variable and Economic Oil Dependence
Upon completion of the study's testing, it was found that the arguments pointing
to the relevance ofnatural resource economic dependence and the corresponding
likelihood of civil war, indeed have merit. Collier and Hoeffler et. al. argued that when a
41 Qualitative historic research supports the lack of resource influence in the Sudan's first
civil war as it was largely based around religiously fueled political power struggles.
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state relies on a natural resource as its primary commodity export (specifically oil), the
state is more likely to experience the outbreak ofcivil war. In their argument, Collier and
Hoeffier asserted that when a state is relies on a single natural resource for more than
30% of its GDP, than it will experience a 50% chance of experiencing civil war. In the
sixteen case study data set, at least half of the states register as experiencing at least a
30% dependence on oil. If you extend down to a range of20% dependence on oil for
GDP contributions, at least 12 of the 16 case studies are relevant (see appendix for full
list of states and figures). These figures serve as support for the argument linking
economic reliance on oil and the onset of conflict.
Although figures were not available for all states, another important element
found in this section is the significance of oil contributing to states' budget revenues.
These figures perhaps are more telling of the importance than oil rents play in the
dynamics of oil-rich states. Regardless of the overall economic health of a state, these
figures reveal the government's reliance on oil rents. This reliance makes it even more
obvious why governments have an active interest in protecting their control of the state's
resources and preventing secession, building up support through clientelistic relationships
with the military and other powerful entities, repressing dissent and opposition, and
consolidating power within the governing body. Without access to oil rents, these
governing bodies would be broke and powerless and less inclined to remain in their
position. Further discussion of secession, military spending, and other such elements will
be included in the following sections.
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As evidenced by the data revealing the overwhelming importance of oil export
earnings as part of the sixteen case studies' states' economic percentages, the findings
provide strong support for Collier and Hoeffler's original argument about the heightened
risks of conflict associated with states' dependence on consolidated natural resource
based economies. Based on the cross-case data analysis, it appears that the states which
have the highest reliance on natural resource exports (as evidenced by the highest GDP
export percentages) also have the most instances and longest lasting civil conflicts within
their borders. Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Yemen, Nigeria, Iran, and Iraq provide some
of the most telling situations illustrative of economic reliance on oil rents, and the
resulting correlative high levels of conflict length and frequency42 (see appendix for
complete figures).
Each of these states relies on the export of their oil natural resources for a
significant portion of their GDP. Furthermore, each country has experienced at least two
separate instances of civil war (many have experienced at least three), as well as
registering amongst the highest numbers of total years at war within the data set. This
fact supports the legitimacy of the arguments that dependence on oil rents for national
revenue contributes to state weakness, insecurity, and situations of conflict.
42 As further evidence of economic oil dependence, World Bank data from 1995 showed
that Algeria, Angola, Nigeria, Yemen, and Iraq were all significantly "dependent" on oil
rents. Determining oil dependence by compiling the ratio of non-fuel mineral exports to
GDP compared with the ratio of oil, gas, and coal exports to GDP. Algeria registered as
23.5% dependent on energy exports; Angola was 68.5% dependent; Nigeria was 39.9%
dependent; Yemen was 46.2% dependent; and Iraq was 19.4%.
56
Citizen Grievances: Poverty, Unemployment, Inequity and Secession
Considering the variables leading to the onset of oil conflict, it was found that the
citizen grievance variable proved to be a particularly relevant influence contributing to
the outbreak of civil war. The most salient grievances found across the sixteen case
studies included poverty, unemployment, inequitable wealth distribution, and a lack of
autonomy. In this way Collier and Hoeller's argument that grievances can contribute
signficantly to the onset of conflict is supported. Furthermore, Collier and Hoeller, and
Ron's assertion that poverty also plays a significant role in causing the onset of conflict,
appears as a significant variable and truth. On the poverty note, every state included in
the study had experienced double digit percentages of populations below the poverty line.
Although this alone seems relevant, and cause for a grievance-based opposition
movement, I argue that unemployment rates serve as a more appropriate indicator of
grievance-based oil conflicts.
Just as poverty figures ranked in the double digits for the sixteen case studies,
unemployment rates also tended to lie in the double-digits. Although both variables
represent conditions of human struggle and suggest poor living standards, from the
research collected during this study, it seems that unemployment is the stronger grievance
capable of eliciting violent responses from the citizenry. In the case examples addressing
oil conflicts, it seemed that one of the most prominent complaints, and the final "straw
that broke the camel's back" occurred directly before the onset of conflict was the
disruption of employment caused by oil operations. Ways in which groups' traditional
forms of employment were interrupted in the case studies included: when environmental
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degradation caused severe damage to fishing waters and growing lands (and they could
no longer earn a living from these farming/fishing economies); when the introduction of
oil companies into a region caused an influx of foreigners and migrant workers resulting
in over-competition for viable employment opportunities; or when oil industry jobs were
only held by specially educated foreigners. In many cases it seemed that the citizens
residing in the oil-rich regions embroiled in conflict were not necessarily in ideological or
practical contention with the practice of oil extraction. The reasons they were so angry
and willing to fight in opposition were because they were so desperate from the
destruction of their former channels of employment and needed change. In one way,
taking up arms in an opposition movement serves as a way for citizens to attempt to
address and fix their grievances. In another way, however, war and conflict can serve as
a conditional opportunity and method of alternative employment. Citizens may be
impelled to take up arms in order to secure access to looted rents (and thus money),
access a paycheck as a "soldier,,,43 or even simply support the conflict because the
insecurity and chaos it causes creates environments conducive to widespread illegal and
black market trade (which can be more profitable than legitimate channels of
employment during peacetime).44 If residents ofoil-rich regions are provided with viable
forms of employment, I argue that grievance-based conflicts will be less likely to occur.
43 This paycheck can either come in the form ofan actual legitimate paycheck from the
government (in some cases very high due to the government's patronage to the military),
or in the form of food, weapons, and other life-essentials from rebel leaders (this kind of
arrangement has been a documented effect resulting in child soldiers' re-enlistment to
rebel groups - not necessarily out of desire, but out of necessity for lack of any better way
of accessing food, support, shelter, and other such resources).
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Secession also proved to be a salient feature of oil-related conflicts. As noted
earlier, of the sixteen states examined as part of the study's data set, eleven of them
included rebel interests, motivations, and demands for regional autonomy and secession.
These figures support the arguments made by Le Billon, Fearon, and Collier and Hoeftler
which assert that rebellions in oil-rich states will be motivated and shaped by secessionist
demands. For oil to really be a causal factor and qualify a secession conflict as a resource
conflict, I argue that the region wishing to secede from the state must host the oil
resources. If the oil fields, oil wells, and oil production facilities are located in an area
other than the area wishing to secede, some other grievance, unrelated to oil, must be at
play. Although this may be the case in some instances of secession-based civil wars,
none of the civil wars included in this data set involving secession demands involved
areas which did not host oil. The evidence revealing the strong presence of secession -
minded motivations within the data set supports the existing arguments regarding the
likelihood of oil-rich states to experience secession-based conflicts. The many examples
of secession interests in the examined case studies makes a strong case for arguments
supporting both greed and grievance related motivations in the onset ofconflict.
Grievances about the distribution of oil rents, as well as complaints regarding the
negative externalities resulting from the oil-extractive industries, proved to be strong
motivations for populations to mobilize and support the movement for secession.
44 Phil Williams, "Transnational Criminal Enterprises, Conflict, and Instability,"
Turbulent Peace: The Challenges ofManaging International Conflict (Washington D.C.:
USIP Press, 2001).
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Three case studies included in the data set serve as particularly strong examples
illustrating how citizens' grievances can contribute to the onset of conflict. Furthermore,
the selected case studies ofAngola, Indonesia, and Nigeria provide strong examples of
how citizens' grievances over complaints ofpoverty, unemployment, and denied access
to adequate shares in oil rents may be manifested through armed movements to secede.
Nigeria provides two strong examples of armed conflict intended to establish a
ceded, autonomous, and independent oil-rich region. The first case of grievance-based
secession interests in Nigeria occurred between the years of 1966 and 1970 in the first
civil war ofNigeria. Although this first war showed the relevance of oil in contributing
conditions to the onset of conflict (competition for control of the resources and its rents,
and grievances from regions claiming to have inadequate shares of revenue), a discussion
of the current conflict in Nigeria's Niger Delta provides obvious and overt examples of
grievance-based armed movements in oil-rich areas.
The second case ofNigerian civil war is situated in the Niger Delta and is
comprised of a grassroots-led coalition of resident dissidents protesting the actions and
dealings of the operating oil industries in the region. Just recently, an uncertain ceasefrre
has been established in the oil-rich southern region as the conflict continues.45 This case
study provides key evidence of: citizen grievances over inequitable access to oil rents and
devastating environmental damage, poverty and high unemployment amongst the
indigenous residents, and interests to cede from the Nigerian state.
45 John Campbell, "Nigeria Proposes Reform of Oil Industry," Council on Foreign
Relations, 2009.
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The Niger Delta conflict provides a near textbook case of oil-related injustices
suffered by local populations. Despite the Niger Delta providing the Nigerian state with
the majority of its export earnings, budgetary funding, and state wealth through the oil
extracted on its lands and offshore facilities, Niger Deltans experience the lowest levels
of poverty in the whole Nigerian state - a state, it should be noted, that registers dismal
scores in terms of Human Development Indicators, ranking 158th out of 177 countries.%
Despite having a wealth ofvaluable natural resources, the indigenous people of the Niger
Delta average two to seven percentage points lower than the average Nigerian in GDP per
capita figures. Not only do the residents of the Niger Delta see little development and
reinvestment into the area where so much wealth is derived from, but their everyday life
is degraded as a result of the damaging externalities associated with the oil extraction and
refining. Environmental degradation resulting from oil production has severe
repercussions on residents' health shorten average life spans, as well as diminishing the
productive capacity of the land and water - resources which the Niger Deltan people rely
on for food and livelihood. Many of the communities throughout the delta rely heavily
on subsistence farming and small-scale economic endeavors such as fishing. Due to oil
spills, leaky structural systems, and the pooling of oil by-products, the once vibrant delta,
now hosts polluted and empty waters and dead, non-producing land. Furthermore, gas
flaring (the practice of burning oil excess and by-products) is a common practice in and
around the oil facilities homed in the Niger Delta. Gas flaring is a major contributor to
the denigration of air quality around the region and medical research has shown links
46 CIA World Factbook, 2008
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between gas flaring and heightened cases of respiratory problems and diseases, cancer
rates, child deaths, and other such health issues experienced by Niger Deltan residents.
Furthermore, many villages and shantytowns have been destroyed in efforts to make
room for increased oil production within the region. Thousands of people have been
displaced, had their homes destroyed by the government and provided with no other
shelter alternative.
Oil production in the Niger Delta has effectively further impoverished the
residents, destroyed traditional forms of employment while failing to provide any viable
livelihood alternatives, left residents homeless, caused them irreparable health damage,
and starved them of any financial benefits their region's oil has produced. These
grievances directed both at the notoriously corrupt Nigerian government and the actual
oil companies operating within the region, have influenced large-scale support for
opposition groups seeking secession. The grievances have provided relevant catalysts for
the onset of conflict and serve as an example of how oil can contribute to situations of
conflict.
The final bit of evidence supporting the notion that oil has played a direct role in
the onset, as well as the duration of the Niger Delta conflict is the way in which peace
settlements have progressed. Various ceasefires have been agreed upon between the
Nigerian government forces and the armed opposition groups, but with little to no
conditional changes made in the Niger Delta, opposition groups have always again
picked up their arms and resumed fighting. In November of2009, the issue ofoil rents
has finally been addressed in Niger Deltan peace talks, and depending upon whether or
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not President Yar'Adua' s administration keeps its word, perhaps the conflict will [mally
draw to a close. The difference between the November peace accord and the other failed
talks, has been the willingness to grant greater shares of oil rents and financial support to
the Niger Delta. The government has agreed to allot 10% ofNigeria' s total oil revenues
to the Niger Delta for projects aimed at development projects, poverty alleviation, and
other such human investments.47 If the government does indeed live up to its word, and
the money is effectively spent in the oil-rich region, the Niger Delta conflict may come to
an end as a result of addressed and ameliorated citizen grievances over oil-related issues.
The Indonesian example of citizen grievances includes many of the same
elements present in the Nigeria case. In 1975, a new build-up of natural gas industries
was promoted in Aceh, Indonesia. The grievances included environmental degradation,
displacement of families and villages, waves of immigration, lack of employment, and
lack of access to gas rents. With the developed gas industry in Aceh, more room was
needed in the gas-specific pump and refining areas. This resulted in the government
forcing the displacement of hundreds of families and entire villages were left homeless.
For those residents left nearby the natural gas facilities, their environment and health
suffered significantly from gas leaks and the discharge of dangerous chemical waste
products. Besides the intrusion on the citizens' homes, environment, and health, their
livelihoods were also affected. For those people intricately connected to the land for
farming and fishing, much of the pollution and barred areas close to gas facilities, their
livelihoods and way of providing food for themselves was significantly disrupted.
47 Tashikalmah Hallah, "Nigeria: Niger Delta to Get 10 Percent of Oil Wealth," AllAfrica,
2009.
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Furthermore, the new built-up gas industry did not provide any new employment
opportunities to the indigenous people of Aceh. Most of the workers used in the gas
facilities were foreign immigrants specifically trained in the field. The influx of
immigration not only brought greater competition for resident jobs, but also brought
along common problems associated with large populations ofmigrant workers - crime,
disease, and corruption.
Motivated by the way the natural gas industry actively degraded the quality of life
for Acehnese residents, an armed movement vying for secession was born. Much of the
movement's propaganda spread message of unfair access to the natural resource riches
born in the ground of the native peoples. The movement's leaders argued that the people
ofAceh, if they could secede from Indonesia and form their own state, would all be rich
and benefit from the natural gas extraction as the people of Brunei had done. Dissatisfied
with the inequitable distribution, unemployment, overcrowding, and degradation around
them, many in Aceh have supported the armed movement against Indonesia in hopes to
one day secede, and form their own autonomous state. Aceh secession movements are
still active today.
The final example of citizen grievances, is presented in the case study of Angola.
Although Angola has experienced two very bloody and damaging civil wars revolving
mostly around the mainland which is often the main focus of conflict research in the
state, a small separatist armed conflict in the northern province of Cabinda, has been
brewing since Angola's independence and continues on today. Unlike the rest of the
Angolan provinces, Cabinda is not actually geographically connected with the Angolan
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state. It is bordered by the Republic of Congo, the Gulf of Guinea, and a narrow land
corridor of the Democratic Republic of Congo (this DRC land strip lies between Cabinda
and the rest of Angola). Comprised primarily of the Bakongo ethnic group, residents of
Cabinda see themselves as having a distinctly different culture and history from mainland
Angolans. Since Cabinda became a part of Angola during the post-colonial process of
state-making,48 the Cabindan separatist group, the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave
of Cabinda (FLEC), have mobilized and physically fought for independence.
The eventual recognition of Cabinda as its own distinct state may have eventually
happened had it not been for the discovery of oil in its offshore territories. Since the
discovery of immense oil abundance in the 1960s, Cabinda has been adopted as a vital
financing region to the state of Angola. Angola has been and remains very much
dependent on oil revenue for the health of its economy, state wealth, government budget,
debt pay-off, and development schemes. Considering the fact that Angola depends so
heavily on oil rents, and more specifically, depends so heavily on oil rents generated out
of Cabinda (Cabinda oil amounts to about 60% of Angola's total oil production), it makes
sense that the government would do everything in its power to prevent the secession of
their northern province.
Not only are the people of Cabinda eager to establish their own autonomous state
because of their belief in their distinct differences distinguishing their ethnic and cultural
group from mainland Angolans, but groups like FLEC are also relevant because they act
48 Cabinda was actually seen as a separate Portuguese colony during the colonial period
in Africa. There were intentions to make Cabinda its own nation but during the fmal
steps of the state creation, the Cabindan people were left out of the negotiations and was
lumped into the Angolan state.
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upon citizen grievances. One of the principle complaints issued by FLEC criticizes the
lack of oil-generated revenue that trickles down into the Cabindan province (especially
considering the majority of the state's wealth is generated from the rents of Cabindan oil
sales).49 Poverty and unemployment rates are quite high in Cabinda despite the region's
capacity to generate so much oil wealth. Like the Indonesian case study, the foreign oil
companies entering Cabindan lands have failed to stimulate local economies as the oil
MNCs bring their own employees and even import their own food, water, and other
goods from Western markets with a literal and figurative wall constructed between the oil
personnel, and the indigenous people of Cabinda..
Governance, Democracy, Patronage, and the Consolidation ofPower
The findings addressing issues of governance support the previously made
arguments made by scholars connecting undemocratic and rent-seeking government
behavior, to increased likelihoods of conflict onset. Nearly every government of the
sixteen case studies selected for this study implemented authoritarian policies, repression
of dissent, patronage relationships, and poor democratic principles. Using democracy
indicators derived from an index constructed by The Economist, 50it was found that nearly
all of the governments in question were considered "Authoritarian Regimes,,51 (ten of the
49 For further reading and information on the FLEC position, refer to the FLEC Manifesto
entitled, "The Nation of Cabinda Conscience Manifest" penned on March 10,2008.
50 The Economist 2008-2009
51 The Democracy Index ranks each state on their performance in free elections, security
of voters, influence of foreign powers on governments, and the strength and capacity of
civil society (employing polity data). Depending on their score, each examined
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sixteen governing bodies were considered "Authoritarian Regimes;" three were ranked as
"Hybrid Regimes;" and three scored as "Flawed Democracies.") (see appendix for full
list). This absence of democratic policies, practices, and ideals within the ruling state
bodies, coupled with the consideration that each state experienced civil war, provides
ample evidence supporting Ross' assertion that democracy and oil conflict are negatively
correlated.
Further on the issue of governance and conflict, the arguments made by Beblawi,
Collier and Hoeffler, and Fearon and Laitin regarding oil-rich states' tendencies to adopt
rent-seeking behavior and patronage relationships is supported by the findings of this
study. Through qualitative analysis of each case study, the governing bodies of most
states experienced, at some point, efforts to claim and control oil rents, as well as the
limited distribution of said rents to key strategic partners (often the military) in efforts to
remain in power and influence. One such way governing bodies acted to preserve their
ability to access oil rents was through nationalization schemes. By removing, or at least
controlling private sector operations in their state's oil industry, nationalized states for the
most part assumed full ownership of natural resources, and therefore assumed full access
to the rents and revenues generated from their extraction. In thirteen of the sixteen states
examined in this study, state-run oil nationalization was a present force. 52 Through
governing body is concerned either a Full Democracy, Flawed Democracy, Hybrid
Regime, or Authoritarian Regime.
52 Some states were considered to be "partially" nationalized. To be considered partially
nationalized, the state may have allowed limited foreign MNC activity to aid in the high-
tech operations of oil extraction. Another way to be considered partially nationalized is if
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nationalization, corrupt governing bodies are able to manipulate the national financial
system and channel, redirect, and absorb national profits into their own accounts.
lllustrating common governance styles and characteristics in oil-rich, conflict-
prone states are the case examples of Burma/Myanmar,53 Iran, and Iraq. Each case study
supports the argument that oil abundance tends to impel governing bodies to create and
implement conditions in which they control a consolidated governing structure, enrich
themselves and those around them through oil rents (in classic patronage/clientelistic
patterns), and repress democratic and/or social developments to ensure future power.
Nearly all of the governments included in the case study are corrupt to some degree, and
it is a common practice for government personnel to enrich themselves individually with
the rents derived from the oil sector (of which they nearly always control through
nationalization-type strategies). The governing bodies in BurmalMyanmar, Iran, and Iraq
were no different.
Burma has seen two significant eras of authoritarian and oppressive rule since
their independence from Britain colonization in 1948.54 In 1963, Ne Win successfully
a very high majority of the state's oil/gas sector is dominated by state-owned companies
(like Russia's Gazprom and Rosneft, or Colombia's Ecopetrol).
53 Under order of the ruling military junta of the South Asian state, in 1989, Burma's
name was officially changed to Myanmar. There is various degrees of controversy
regarding the name change as various international actors and bodies fail to acknowledge
the name change because of their failure to acknowledge the ruling junta as a fair,
legitimate, or democratic entity.
54 It is significant to note that Burma had a very strong and vibrant oil economy in place
during British colonial rule. Britain depended on their easy and cheap access to Burmese
oil to fuel war efforts, budding industrialism at home, and improved qualities of life for
British citizens. Because Great Britain has negligible supplies of its own domestic oil for
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implemented a coup d'etat, and consolidated rule under his socialist vision. Ne Win's
vision was to isolate Burma and make it a sort of socialist archetypal system. Through
his vision, Burma became a socialist, one-party state with consolidated power in Ne
Win's hands. Most sectors of the economy were nationalized, including the creation of
Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MaGE). Although Ne Win was very much influenced
by socialist ideology and motivated by his belief in such a system, there certainly exists
the possibility that he recognized the wealth and security he could obtain if he indeed
controlled one of the largest revenue makers - a sole-operating oil company.
Although Ne Win put in place many of the governing systems consistent with
other oil-rich conflict-prone states, he would not be the last to benefit from his
consolidation efforts. In 1988, a military junta overthrew Ne Win and has ruled the state
ever since. Ongoing conflicts between the heavily financed Burmese army (the military
enjoys direct access to oil rents) and grassroots opposition groups discontent with the
ruling junta are still present today. The junta adopted similar governance styles as
enacted by Ne Win, but arguably, have been taken to a new level of intensity and
repression.
Since the 1989 take-over, the Burmese government has come to exemplify a
governing body effectively using their state's natural resource wealth to their advantage.
The "advantage" however, also creates a fair amount of blowback in the form of citizen
discontent and their willingness to take up arms in opposition. The ruling junta in Burma
energy needs, it relied heavily on its colonies for natural resources. It is also important to
note that the Burmese independence movement was largely situated around citizens'
grievances (for economic discontent) and the waves and strikes spurring the
independence movement in Burma were born from and occurred at the oil fields in 1938.
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conclusive and thorough information to be reported, but various accounts have made their
way outside of the country. Such information points to the authoritarian and repressive
governing style, dependence on patronage systems, and even the use of forced labor. In
terms of oil-related elements of the junta's governance, the revenues create both selfish
incentive, as well as necessary distribution patterns. The junta controls all aspects of the
state, including the oil industry (although, in 2007, Burma did welcome foreign
investment from 16 different oil companies to work in collaboration with MaGE in the
hopes to even further boost revenue and economic security for the state through oil rents).
There have been several claims that the leaders provide direct access of oil revenues to
the military.55 Exemplifying the workings of a patronage system, the ruling junta has
coerced the support of the military as well as several other influential groups. Through
this coercion (using a portion of oil rents), the ruling junta has satisfied and made
complacent those entities capable of threatening their continued power. Using just
enough money out of their own piles of oil rents, the junta has invested in their longevity
as powerful actors within the Burmese state.
Along with establishing clientelistic relationships with the military and other
influential state groups, there also exists evidence that the state actually enforced unpaid
labor by civilians on oil industry building projects. Furthermore, a lawsuit accusing
Unocal (an oil MNC) of sharing responsibility for human rights violations in Burma
highlights the corrupt role the governing junta has ascribed to. It is argued that because
55 On a further note, the military is notorious for paying its soldiers well, thus suggesting
war and conflict contributes to positive employment outlets, as well as dissuading their
trained soldiers from joining more populist based armed movements.
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Unocal (who operates in oil production in Burma) contributes direct funds to the
government, they may be considered accessories and responsible parties to any crime or
injustice committed by the government. Indirectly, this lawsuit, filed under the Alien
Torts Claim Act in the United States, points to the guilt and corruption of the Burmese
ruling junta. If democracies and democratic principles are indeed contributing conditions
of peace, then Burma's dismal democratic performance and corresponding constant level
of civil conflict serves to support the theory coupling democracy and peace as a
dependent pair.
The case study ofIraq also reveals the ways in which governing styles can playa
role in the onset and duration of conflict. Following the 1963 coup which brought the
Baathist victors to power, the democratic, progressive, and flourishing Iraq which had
been built on effective development investments from the deep wealth acquired through
the state's oil industry, was soon to be transformed into a repressive, authoritarian,
impoverished, and broken state. From the time oil began to flow in Iraq, conflict and
competition for control over the considerable reserves of valuable resources led to
successive coups and violent regime changes. Despite the turbulence in government, the
state itself benefitted from wisely constructed development plans and oil rent distribution
to social services for the general population (including, free education for all Iraqi
children up through the university level, free healthcare available to all citizens, access to
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cheap food, protection from a sophisticated military, and reserves of over $35 billion to
ensure the future provision of such services).56
Following the 1963 coup and the concurrent rise to power of Saddam Hussein, the
state began to fall into disrepair, particularly after Hussein sustained a devastatingly
costly war against neighboring Iran in the 1980s (estimated at costing around $100
billion).57 Hussein served as a perfect example of oil-backed authoritarian. From his
position of power Hussein further consolidated his Baath party's grip on power, as well
as his own position of power within the party, and consequently the state. He killed
political opponents, subjugated and arguably terrorized portions of his population, and
abused the continued flow of oil wealth for his own personal use, while his once thriving
state fell into disrepair and destruction during the Iran-Iraq war. Like the Burmese junta,
Hussein and his Baathist supporters employed the tactics of patronage and c1ientelism to
gain support for themselves, and unsubstantiate opponents (they courted the military with
some of the highest percentages of spending contributed to this sector, as well as other
leaders and "loyal" groups). With rule consolidated in Hussein, Iraq resembled nothing
of a democracy. The way oil wealth was used to shape and bolster the governing body at
the expense of other areas, it seems to have contributed to the civilian opposition and
motivation for conflict within the state.
Like Burma and Iraq, Iran too shared many qualities indicative of an
authoritarian, undemocratic governing body, and abused its control of oil rents to




establish such a system. Diverging from the Burmese and Iraqi model, Iran seemed to
work backwards, beginning with capitalism and privatization, undergoing a revolution,
and then ushering in a more socialist regime. The history of oil in Iran is long and
complicated with many actors' investing their interests and motivations into the oil
industry, attempting to gain access to the incredible stores of oil and its related rents
located below the Iranian state. Since oil was discovered and produced in Iran (around
1908 through the Anglo-Persian Oil Company), foreign influences have effectively
exerted their agendas on the state. This influence helped shape the political state into
what it became. Effectively describing the role oil played in Iranian politics, scholar
Joseph Tragert described the Iranian relationship (under the Shah) with oil as,
"The Shah's regime was secular and capitalist at its core. The system functioned
like this: Oil revenues purchased the necessary food and supplies for the
population. Industrial ownership was concentrated in a small group of wealthy
elites, who were generally aligned with the Shah. Foreign oil companies made
sure that the oil was flowing and that the subsidies that generated revenue masked
the inefficiencies of domestic industry. However, there were shortages, and many
people did without luxuries - or even without the basics. Against this backdrop,
the Shah staged an almost obscenely opulent party to celebrate the 25,000th
anniversary of the founding of the Persian Empire by Cyrus and of monarchical
rule in Iran. ,,58
This succinct description of the state's relationship with oil reveals the conditions lending
to civilian discontent and the birth of a revolution. The case in Iran reveals the vast
inequality and inequitable distribution of resource rents that is a salient feature of the oil-
rich conflict-prone states included in this study. Following the Shah's reign59 a populist,
58 Elaine Sciolino, Persian Mirrors The Elusive Face ofIran ~~ew York: Simon and
Schuster, 2000).
73
socialist revolution in 1979 gained popular support and succeeded in replacing the
Westernly-oriented Shah. Riding offof the nationalist and socialist rhetoric established
by popular leader Mohammad Mossadegh, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 introduced a
new way of governance. Based on more socialist platforms, Islamic Republic leader
Khomeini took control of the state. In a nationalist move, Khomeini kicked out all
foreign oil NINCs and nationalized the oil industry. Using oil rents to spur the growth of
alternative economic sectors, the new Iranian regime attempted to diversify the economy
and promote small-scale growth, but unlike the Shah, Khomeini failed to employ the
services of trained and knowledgeable economists. Through misguided investments and
an overwhelming expense on the Iran-Iraq war (like Iraq, the war effort drained the
state's savings from an estimated $100 billion war bill), the new Iranian government also
failed to effectively and equitably manage its oil wealth. The disconnect between the
ruling power controlling the distribution of resource rents, and the everyday citizen
starved of resource rents access contributed significantly to the instance of conflict.
As the examples of Burma, Iraq, and Iran reveal, there seems to be a correlations
between weak or non-existent democratic principles in oil-rich governing bodies, and a
high propensity for conflict. Furthermore, governing bodies who fail to distribute
resource rents equitably throughout the population are more open to the threat of conflict.
59 For a valuable discussion on the relationship and governance ofthe Shah and his
competitor Mossadegh, authors Prados (2006), Blum (2004), and Kinzer (2003) provide
in-depth analyses and information regarding the relationship Iran held with the oil
industry, oil export partners, and oil MNCs.
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Conflict Duration Findings
The following section includes analysis and discussion of the proposed variables linked
to the duration of conflict.
The Lootability Variable: Bunkering, Extortion, and Military Spending
Upon examination of the sixteen case studies, the findings addressing the
relevance of oil as tool for armed group funding was mixed. Supporting Ross' argument
that oil conflicts fail to include strong elements of looting, oil as a resource was not often
"looted" by rebel groups and used for financial support in the selected sixteen case
studies. I propose that this finding is a result of the inherent qualities associated with oil
that make it harder to be "looted." Because oil is a harder resource to transfer
inconspicuously (note the discussion on the differences between oil and other natural
resources such as diamonds and narcotics in the section headed "Why Oi17"), it is
probably less frequent that rebel groups will seek its extraction as a viable method of
funding. Furthering the disincentive to use oil as a form of funding for belligerent groups
is the fact that oil extraction necessitates a certain level of expertise and legitimate
infrastructure, which many rebel groups are not equipped to operate.60
Despite the argument that oil looting is not a very relevant variable in oil-related
resource conflicts, it does playa role in some conflicts. Of the sixteen case studies
analyzed, six cases presented evidence of how oil was co-opted and "looted" by rebel
60 A fmal reason preventing oil from being an effectively looted resource to trade as a
contraband commodity, may be the way in oil is so stringently regulated and monitored
as a industry. With regulatory bodies like OPEC and heavy industry dominance of major
oil NINCs, it may be difficult for illegitimate and belligerent traders to find a viable
market in which to sell any contraband resources.
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groups to aid in their funding efforts. Nigeria was the only case where contraband oil
was acquired and transformed into supporting funds in the more traditional sense of a
"lootable" resource. In areas around the Niger Delta ofNigeria, several opposition
groups have mobilized and become legitimate forces in the region. Various groups such
as MEND have established themselves as legitimate parties in the Niger Delta reality,
largely in part of the sustained relevance they have achieved as an armed group through
the financial support provided by the revenue generated from the stolen oil.
The way in which oil can be "looted" is through a process referred to as "oil
bunkering." Through this process, thieves may directly tap into legitimately operating oil
pipes used to transport the natural resource from the site of the well to its final destination
(often a refining site, port for transport, etc.). This siphoning off of the flowing oil can
result in hundreds of thousands of stolen barrels of oil sold fit to be sold on the black
market. In the Niger Delta, a sophisticated and effective operation of oil bunkering as
been established by various rebel groups and opportunists.61 Stolen crude from the Niger
Delta can be sold at rates estimated between $15 and $20 (USD) per barrel- well below
the legitimate international market price. Because there are virtually zero operational
costs (the oil is pumped for them using the tools, resources, and skills of the present oil
companies), the rents derived from the bunkered oil translate into pure rents. One
61 In the Niger Delta, bunkers often tap directly into existing pipelines and siphon oil into
barges waiting in the shallow waters of the delta. Due to significant corruption, police
forces are often paid off and do nothing to prevent the illegal bunkering from happening.
Also, because of the violence associated with groups engaged in bunkering activities,
many locals avoid traffic through known creeks and water passages around bunkering
areas making it that much more convenient for the thieving groups to operate easily. The
stolen oil from such operations are often then transported to near-by weak states such as
Benin and Ivory Coast.
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estimate has guessed that oil bunkering in the Niger Delta, at the height of its popularity
as an illegal money-making enterprise, created profits of up to US $2-3 million daily and
$750 million- $1 billion annually.62 Supporting Weinstein's argument63 saying that
ideological leaders are often crowded out by opportunistic finance-driven leaders, in the
Nigerian case of oil bunkering, it seems that groups looking to take advantage of weak
security situations are just as relevant in oil bunkering operations as those groups seeking
to bunker as a way of supporting their ideological battle against the state and oil
companies, and highlighting their grievances with the conditions within the Delta.
In an obvious way, bunkering raises funds to support aggrieved groups' missions, but
also serves to support their movement as a form of protest and disruption. At the height
of insecurity and conflict in the Niger Delta in the mid-2000s, rampant sabotage and oil
bunkering resulted in a significant decline in oil production as exports from the region
slowed to a trickle due to oil companies' reluctance to operate in the danger and conflict-
ridden area. This scaled back oil operation resulted in billions of dollars of lost revenue,
as well as more oil spills (intentional and unintentional) furthering the environmental
damage and inhospitable living conditions in the Niger Delta. Such actions did however
increase the power and ini1uence of such belligerent groups as the government was
forced to address their grievances and negotiate an ameliorated solution.
The second way rebel groups were able to manipulate and benefit financially from
their regions' oil abundance was the practice of kidnapping oil employees and holding
62 Human Rights Watch "Oil Bunkering"
63 Weinstein, 2007
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them for ransom, extorting major oil companies. Kidnapping oil workers as a method of
raising funds for rebel groups has been an effective method in the Niger Delta of Nigeria,
Colombia, Peru, the Sudan, and Indonesia. It is also relevant to note that the kidnapping
tactic has been a fairly new phenomenon. All of the conflicts involving oil personnel
kidnappings are all current conflicts, still progressing in 2009. Considering that the
kidnap/ransom tactic is a fairly new phenomenon, it should be noted by scholars, policy-
makers, and operational strategists that it has the potential to grow further as a trend and
may serve as an effective area to try and prevent in efforts to end conflict, limit the
civilian affects of conflict, and insulate conflict within as small parameters as possible.
There also exists the danger that the kidnap/ransom tactic is part of a copy-cat trend. If
this is true, kidnappings and ransoms may emerge as a relevant weapon and funding tool
for rebel groups operating in all types of conflicts, not just resource conflicts.
The next topic addressing the ways oil may be manipulated as a [mancial asset
used to prolong conflict is military spending. The rationale motivating the examinations
and analyses of funds expended to national military units in conflict states, is the notion
that oil wealth generated by the state, particularly in states where the hydrocarbon sector
is nationalized, may be used by the military to protect the empowered regime's security.
If a governing body depends on, or even simply benefits from the financial contributions
provided by oil rents, it would make sense that that governing body would take proactive
steps to ensure the security and sustained flows of such vital resources.
As discussed in the section addressing governance issues of oil states, corruption and
unethical distribution of oil rents is common practice. In many cases, the governing body
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and its personnel benefit individually as their own accounts are often substantially
enriched with portions of oil rents. In "greed" scenarios like these, it would make sense
that whoever is in power and control of the state would enact certain plans to ensure that
they remain in power and further enjoy the financial benefits of claiming state oil
revenue. One such way a state may create such protection is to court, and resource the
military. Providing generous resources to the military can lead to a sympathetic and
obliging military body, willing to help the hand which feeds it. Furthermore, a strong and
financed military (which indeed is obedient and loyal to the acting government) can serve
as an effective and powerful force capable of protecting the residing government and
repelling any attacks or threats from opposition groups (both armed or political).
I hypothesized that states abundant in oil would have built-up militaries with significant
portions of funding allotted to them. Considering the sixteen state data set, I expected
that the states would have well-resourced militaries and a resulting quickness to employ a
"military answer," thus contributing to the overall prevalence of conflict. Despite the
proposed logic, the data analysis conducted in this study failed to support such a
hypothesis, but was capable of providing a viable alternative theory.
In order to test for a state's propensity to enrich its military by way ofoil rents, I
examined the percentages and amounts of money invested in military spending per state.
I expected oil rich states to reveal the highest numbers for military spending, but found
that the study's sixteen states actually fell within the upper-middle in terms of state
military expenditures. The average expenditure of each state was similar to that of the
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57th highest military spending state out of 174 polled (with about 2.7% of their GDP
spent on military expenditures).
This finding does not negate any possibility of a correlative link between state
military spending and conflict. The analysis suggests that state military spending and
conflict are linked, and that the amount of expenditure devoted to the military is
significant. I argue that the states in this data set experienced conflict because the state
did not invest enough money in their militaries. The argument exists that state money
devoted to military build-up leads to conditions conducive to conflict. This may be the
case in conflicts where natural resources do not playa role, but in resource conflicts, it
seems to follow that in general, states devoting significant portions of their GDP earnings
towards military resourcing do not experience conflict as often as states which spend less
on military. Furthermore, it seems that states who spend the least on their militaries
experience few conflicts (which is probably attributed to a lack of concern over security
issues or a lack of concern over realistic threats). This leaves the middle-spending
section of states as those experiencing the most frequent situations of conflict, including
those related to oil.
It is interesting to note that oil states do indeed tend to spend more on their
militaries than some other states - Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, some of the
richest oil states in the world, all register within the top 15 highest military spending
states. The difference between those oil-rich states, which have not experienced much.
conflict, and the oil-rich states included in the study, is that the oil-rich states of this study
simply did not invest enough in their military. Supporting Bennett and Starn's argument
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that predicts when opposing sides' resources are even, a conflict will last longer, had the
state provided more resources and financial support to its military, the conflicts present in
the sixteen analyzed states may have ended earlier, or not even occurred in the first place.
Had the state tipped the scales on their own military's behalf, opposition groups may not
have seen an armed movement a viable option (as they would be immediately
overwhelmed and beaten), or the government could have provided a resource advantage
to their military over the opposition group, and thus ended the conflict in their favor at an
earlier juncture. Because the states invested enough of their budgetary wealth on the
military, they were a close match for the mobilized opposition armed group which caused
an even-sided match, and thus an extended conflict. Because the states did not invest
enough, the opposition armed group recognized the potential military weakness and took
the opportunity to express their discontent with the government through a more drastic
avenue - armed civil war.64 In these ways, state military spending in oil-rich states can
both affect the onset and duration ofconflicts in unanticipated ways.65
64 This discussion is in no way to be intended as a call for oil-rich states to build up their
militaries as a way to reduce the risk and prevalence of conflict. Police states with
overwhelming strong militaries are often amongst the lowest performing states in terms
of human rights, democratic principles, and human independence. The intention is only
to acknowledge the way in which military funding can affect the onset and duration ofa
conflict.
65 A second note on military spending in oil-rich states acknowledges the role of
nationalization strategies. States with nationalized oil economies may be more capable of
spending higher proportions of state revenues on the military because, depending on the
overall economic strategy, they may have a significant amount of extra oil revenue at
their disposal (more so perhaps than states harboring privatized oil operations which sees
portions of the oil rents leave the country through private investors). In this way,
nationalization may be an important element in determining the amounts of money and
resources a state has at its disposal.
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Although there was an anticipated connection between military spending and
conflict in oil-rich states, a final element of how resources may be used to fund armed
groups is relative to non-formal payments, perhaps left out ofthe national budget figures.
Throughout the research relative to the sixteen case studies, a trend of "arms-for-oil"
seemed to persist throughout several of the states. In such cases, oil would be directly
traded for arms and weapons, or traded for money intended and used to purchase such
military resources. Such examples provide even more obvious evidence pointing at how
oil as a natural resource, can be traded and sold as a viable product in exchange for
weapons and resources to fuel conflict. A few examples of such transactions include
arrangements in Indonesia, Sudan, Colombia, Chad, and Angola.
In Indonesia, it has been cited that the military under Suharto enjoyed direct
access to resource rents through the company PermaMina. Suharto came to power
through his partnership with the military, and remained in power through brutal military-
led repression for many years as a result of his generosity to the national armed forces.
In Chad, the government used $4.5 million of the awarded $25 million bonus received by
the state from oil companies setting up shop to begin oil extraction and construction of
the oil pipeline in 2000. This is particularly relevant as this arms procurement
contradicted the later reneged upon World Bank and IMF mandated plan instructing that
at least 80% of the generated oil revenues had to be spent on development and public
k . 66wor s proJects.
66 Daniela Kroslak, "Chad: The Oil Effect?" International Crisis Group, 2009.
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In Colombia, the United States has developed and invested several hundreds of
millions of dollars in its military partnership with the South American state. Although it
may be argued that this partnership is part of a plan under the "War on Drugs," Colombia
does provide the United States with oil resources. In 2009, the United States increased its
military support in Colombia to include significant resourcing to a military base on the
ColombiaIVenezuela border which prompted Venezuela's president, Hugo Chavez, to
issue statements arguing that this partnership may represent an act of aggression on the
part of both Colombia and the United States and may prompt a war between the
neighboring South American states. The proximity ofthe base with some of Colombia's
most productive oil wells may be significant as well.
In the Sudan, there has been documentation showing how state wealth generated
by oil production in the South, has been directly used to purchase weapons used in the
conflicts around Darfur, and southern secession. The proposed plan to allow Southern
Sudan the right to vote for autonomy and secession has been a highly contested area of
peace negotiations in the on-going conflict.67 The government's disinterest in losing the
oil-rich region, a major source oftheir fmancing, is likely the primary factor causing
strained relations and violence over the future vote.
Finally, in Angola, the United States made a deal trading weapons for oil
resources. The transfer ofarms to Angola must be significant as Angola provides the
United States with 7% of its imported oil. Furthermore, China has recently upped its
presence and trade in the African continent. Between 2003 and 2006, China traded up to
67 Julie Flint and Alex De Waal, Darfur: A Short History ofthe Long War (London and
New York: Zed Books, 2005).
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$500 million worth of weapons in exchange for access to Angola's oil supplies. In a US
Congressional Research Service report, it was argued that such sales and trades is meant
to "enhance" the status of China as an intemational political player, and, "increasing its
ability to obtain access to significant natural resources, especially oil.,,68 Such blatant
maneuvering of resource-rich states, and eager clients of those states, highlights yet
another way in which oil can serve an active role in contributing to the conditions of
conflict.
The Angolan Civil War and the "Booty Futures" Variables
Arriving at our next variable, the relevance of "booty futures," it was found that it
did not playa significant role in affecting the duration of conflict in the sixteen case
studies. Of the sixteen states analyzed, only four cases revealed that the employment of
booty futures acted as a relevant influence in the conflict. Although this variable does not
have strong evidence suggesting its overall importance in oil conflicts, it is hard to
completely discount the relevance of booty futures in resource wars for two reasons. The
first reason is that, although booty futures do not appear to playa significant role in oil-
specific resource conflicts, they may prove to be relevant influences in other resource-
based conflicts (diamonds, water, timber, etc.), and thus deserve attention and
consideration in other areas connected with resource conflict.69 The second reason why
the booty futures variable should not be completely ignored is the fact that it was indeed
quite significant in affecting the duration of at least four situations of conflict. Although
68 Council on Foreign Relations, 2009
69 Ross, 2002.
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it may not emerge as a common trend or relevant feature for policy-makers, conflict
specialists, and other practitioners to have high on their radar, it is a worthwhile area to at
least consider when examining any given conflict. Although booty futures played a
pertinent role in four of the sixteen case studies, it is not enough to support the notion that
this variable has widely applied effects on conflict.
As was the case with some of the other variables, developing a systematic way of
testing for the presence of "booty futures" was difficult. Because booty futures are a
considerably taboo and negatively perceived economic tactic, and due to the lack of
transparency and accurate systems of data collection within many of the conflict states
included in the data set, accessing the types of information capable of highlighting the
existence of booty futures was very difficult, and in many cases, perhaps even non-
existent. Regardless of the difficulty in uncovering a consistent and applicable data
source for the cross-case analysis, research revealed some situations where booty futures
indeed played a role in affecting the duration of states' civil wars. Using the Angolan
conflict as a particularly relevant case study, the following description will use collected
data on that state's government oil trade as a prime example of how the booty futures
variable can influence situations of conflict.
The Angolan civil war is one of the richest examples of conflicts affected by
natural resource wealth. Experiencing three major conflicts since the 1960s, Angola
provides a classic case study of how natural resource control and extraction serves to
lengthen conflicts as a means of providing valuable and consistent financing to armed
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groups. Interestingly, the Angolan case includes groups dependent both on diamond
resources, as well as oil resources.
During the Cold War, Angola was the battleground of an international proxy war,
which pitted the two world superpowers against each other. In the epic quest to claim
support and influence throughout the Third World, the Soviet Union and United States
were confronted with opposing interests in Angola. The United States chose to support
the anti-Communist, Western friendly group, National Front of Angola (FNLA)lNational
Union for the Total Independence ofAngola (UNITA),70 while the Soviets devoted their
support to their ideological match, the communist leaning Populist Movement for the
Liberation ofAngola (MPLA). Providing arms, money, and resources, the two
superpowers more or less served as financiers for the bloody civil war.71 Following the
decline of Cold War sponsorship in the 1980s, each group was forced to find alternative
funding, and soon found it in the state's abundant natural resource reserves.
Operating as the more belligerent group, MPLA mainly operated and flourished in
fringe areas of the countryside. This led to their procurement and control of the country's
many richly endowed diamond fields. In typical "blood diamond" fashion, the MPLA
rebel group became wealthy and capable of continuing operations due to the revenue
70 For the purposes of this study, FNLA and UNITA will be considered as a common
group. Although the groups were distinct, in most situations they worked together, one
forming from the other. The groups did at some points of the civil war fight against each
other, the significant factor is that they fought in opposition of the MPLA, were both
sponsored by the United States. For the sake of convenience, UNITA will be
acknowledged as the primary group.
71 John Prados, Sqfe for Democracy The Secret Wars ofthe CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee,
2006).
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gleaned from diamond sales. On the other hand, because UNITA was in support of the
acting government, and because the government controlled the oil industry, UNITA was
largely funded by the rents derived from Angola's national oil trade.72 Because the two
sides were financed in similar ways - through the extraction and sale of natural resources
- neither side ever made significant gains against the other, resulting in a prolonged and
extended conflict, until 1992, when MPLA seized control of an important oil town, Soyo.
Able to impede a significant source of their opponent's financial support through the
Soyo oil hub, the MPLA took a significant advantage over UNITA. Realizing their
reliance on oil rents to finance their armed struggle and remain a viable entity, UNITA
made a desperate move to make up some financial ground on their MPLA opponents.
In three deals, the government-supporting UNITA sold the future rights to Angolan
diamond mines and, specific to this study, future oil rights. In terms of diamond booty
futures, UNITA made a deal with IDAS, a private military/security firm, stipulating that
if the contractors could wrest control of the diamond mines away from MPLA (and thus
remove their financing tool), IDAS would be rewarded with a cut of the future rents
generated by those diamond mines. In another diamond booty futures deal, UNITA sold
the international diamond conglomerate, DeBeers, the rights to offshore mining rights for
72 As described, the Angolan case study also provides exemplary evidence of how natural
resources may be looted and used to fund armed groups (another variable included in this
study). Also of note, this case study provides interesting evidence of how the location of
natural resources can help determine conflict situations. Because UNITA was funded by
oil rents, largely in the form of off-shore sources, the violence and insecurity rampant
throughout Angolan lands which affected the flow of diamond revenues (and therefore
the viability ofMPLA) did not affect UNITA's financial support. Other scholars speak
further on the relevance of geography and location in shaping resource conflicts.
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$17 million. Furthermore, and of significance to this study of oil, UNITA was
significantly enriched through a reported booty futures deal. Supposedly gaining $3.5
billion for the 7 year future rights to an off-shore oil field block, UNITA once again had
its needed financing. Much of the $3.5 billion booty futures pay-out was put towards
buying military equipment.73 This change of fortunes for UNITA made up for their
losses in Soyo at the hands of the MPLA, and evened the capacity levels of each armed
side. It may be argued that because of the booty futures pay-out, UNITA avoided
looming defeat and an end to the civil war with the MPLA as the victors. Instead of
UNITA running out of financial resources and thus losing, the booty futures contributed
to the further viability of the government-sponsored armed group, resulting in the civil
war's duration extended by another seven years. In an unrelated conflict in the province
of Cabinda, separatist fighters have managed to seize some oil and gas production
capacities, and announced the, "commencement of oil and gas lease operations in the
territory secured by the Cabinda Defense Force.,,74 In selling the rights to the seized oil
and gas facilities, the separatist movement will be able to financially benefit and sustain
their fighting efforts. By selling the future rights to the state's oil fields, Angola's civil
war was lengthened in a prime example of how booty futures can significantly impact
conditions of conflict.
In a [mal note on booty futures, although the sixteen case study analysis failed to




variable is on the radar of international organizations seeking to resolve and limit
situations of conflict. More in a response to booty futures in other natural resources
(diamonds, minerals, etc.), the United Nations Security Council has issued various
decrees and resolutions seeking to eliminate the sale and thus the conflict relevance of




AN OIL INFLUENCE IN INTERSTATE WARS?
Many of the academics examining the conditions and circumstances of "resource
conflict" concern themselves with the instances of intrastate wars and conflicts. Using
data sets comprised of civil wars, a majority of the academic literature draws connections
between a singular country's natural resource abundance and its consequent higher
propensity to fall into conflict within its own borders. Largely left out of the natural
resource conflict discussion is the affect natural resources may play in interstate conflicts.
Supposing that a natural resource, whether it be diamonds, timber, water, oil or gas, has
the ability to influence the onset and duration of intrastate conflicts, can the same
argument be made for interstate conflicts? Extending the resource conflict concept to
data sets and case studies of interstate conflict, in addition to the more extensive research
collected on intrastate conflict, a new and valuable dimension of natural resources may be
conceived.
In analyzing the motivations and reasons explaining the link: between natural
resources and conflict, many researchers have argued a "greed" or "grievance" theory.75
In the "grievance" scenario, the theory argues that rebels groups will organize and fight
as a result of their unrnet grievances. Most of theses grievances are directed at the
governing body of a particular state, and in the case of resource based conflicts, the
75 Collier and Hoeffler, 2004.
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grievances tend to revolve around the general population's access (or lack thereof) to any
accrued benefits (usually monetary benefits) of natural resource extraction and sale.
With the extension of the resource conflict theory in explanations of interstate conflict,
the grievance premise would not necessarily be applicable as the conflict would be
between two states with two separate governing bodies. It would be unlikely that the
citizenry of one state would aggress against the governing body of another state - a
governing body which would seemingly have no responsibility to serve, protect, or
dispense resource rents to the aggrieved foreign nationals. In this way, the "greed"
theory appears to be the likely motivation for actors of different states to be impelled to
engage in war or conflict over natural resource interests.
As an introduction to this area of study, this section will briefly examine the
possible role that oil and gas have in influencing the instance of interstate conflict.76 The
main hypothesis driving this examination is the idea that, if natural resources, specifically
oil, have the ability to influence the onset, duration, and characteristics of conflict in the
realm of intrastate wars, it should also have an effect and influence in shaping the nature
of some interstate wars. If for instance a rebel group, secessionist group, or other such
sub-national entity should be economically tempted to engage in conflict with the
presiding controller of a state's oil operations (and therefore oil rents), why would a state
76 As is the case for intrastate conflicts, several types of natural resources have been
theorized as having a role in influencing the onset and duration of conflict. Diamonds,
timber, water, minerals, etc. all have the potential to influence the existence of conflict,
but this study is concerned with the particular role ofoil in conflict. Furthermore, there
have been some hypothesized connections between the diamond trade and its ability to
influence interstate conflict through rebel financing through "neighboring" theories of
conflict (ie: conflict connections between neighboring states of Liberia and Sierra Leone,
or South Africa and Zimbabwe).
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not be tempted to gain control of another state's oil resources if the war "prize" is the
promise of increased oil supplies and its resulting rents. It is argued that the economic
incentive for a belligerent group operating in a national context, on the most basic level,
is the same incentive for a belligerent state operating in an international context.
A further extension of the "greed" theory driving the relevance of oil in interstate
conflicts, is the notion that a state's national security is now intricately linked to its
energy security. In this argument, it is hypothesized that a state, in the interest of its
national security, may be incentivized to exert its influence over other states linked to the
oil trade. This "influence" may consist of any realm of coercive measures, geopolitical
manipulations, clandestine operations, economic posturing, or active military engagement
and declaration of war leading to interstate conflict. The states "linked to the oil trade"
may consist of states with active oil production operations, proven oil reserves, oil
refmery capabilities, or even may depend on their geographic location and proximity to
hydrocarbon pipelines, and water or land oil transit routes. Ultimately, the state must
hold some capacity for determining the production, distribution, and access of foreign
states to oil supplies. If in fact access to oil and gas (ie: energy sources) is an integral
element of a state's national security strategy, it may be likely that in an environment of
oil scarcity and lack of access, a state may be impelled to take military and violent action
against a state that may be contributing to that scarcity and lack of access as a matter of
"national security."
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There is no question that both major oil producers and oil consumers have
engaged in interstate conflict within the past sixty years77 and it is not the purpose of this
study to argue that all instances of interstate conflict were connected or directly resulting
from states' oil interests. It is intended only to suggest the possibility of evidence
pointing to the partial role oil may have played in some interstate conflicts. There exist
many theorized reasons why a state may engage in war with another state, particularly in
the Cold War context (of which a majority of the post-WWII history lies in).78 Can a
state's interest in securing and controlling natural resources, specifically the
economically and strategically valuable oil resource, be added to the list of those
theorized reasons, even if it is only one reason out of many impelling state's decision to
engage in war?
Did They Do It for Oil?
Considering the conditions of foreign relations and conflict histories of various oil
producers and consumers, several examples of the oil variable shaping and influencing
interstate conflict have been theorized upon. In general, the conflicts in which oil
interests plays a significant role in shaping the specifications, motivations, and outcomes
of the conflict are expected to fall into two separate categories: conflicts between border
states disputing who controls and owns sub-surface oil reserves; and conflicts between
states disputing access of a consuming nation to a producing nation's oil reserves.
77 The distinction of "sixty years" is used because this was about the amount of time past
the end of WWII. WWI saw the beginning of oil relevance, and WWII saw a significant
increase in nations' reliance on oil as their principle energy source.
78 S. Van Evera (1999), M. Finnemore (2003), RJ. Art (1971)
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Conflicts proposed for future study on oil-related interstate wars include: the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait in the early 1990s; disputes along the border of Colombia and
Venezue1a; maritime border disputes between Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea located
in the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea; the war between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s; the 2008 war
between Georgia and Russia; the United States' invasion ofIraq (Gulf War I and II); and
the United States' intervention in various oil-rich developing countries throughout the
Cold War (Indonesia, Angola, Iran, etc.).79 More insight into these interstate conflicts
and others involving oil-rich states may serve to undercover and promote a new area of
resource conflict.
79 See Appendix B for a map higWighting the major oil fields, or "giants" ("giants" are
what particularly large and high volume producing oil fields are often referred to as).
The map is was designed by researchers P. Mann, M.K. Hom, and r. Cross through the





From the time oil was drilled from the ground and invented as a new form of
energy, its strategic worth as a valuable natural resource has become evident. Holding
political, economic, environmental, and social clout, it seems that the oil natural resource
also holds significant influence in the realm of conflict and security. Positioning this
paper in the resource curse realm of academic study, I have supported the arguments that
oil has an influence in conditioning the onset and duration of conflict, and indeed is a
natural resource capable of causing a "curse" on its host state. Upon the examination of
sixteen examples of states which have experienced both civil war and oil extraction, it
has become apparent that elements of greed and grievances over oil playa role in causing
the outbreak of conflict, and affecting the length of said conflict. This study's results
assert support for the notions that: (1) when oil acts as a primary commodity export and
significant contributor to states' budget revenue, the likelihood ofcivil war will heighten;
(2) when oil industries correspond with regional poverty, unemployment, inequities, and
environmental degradation, citizen grievances will likely induce civil conflict; (3) when
governments are corrupt, clientelistic, authoritarian, and repressive, the likelihood of
conflict is raised; (4) perhaps unlike other natural resources, oil is not commonly looted
for support of rebel groups, but oil rents are often used to bolster state militaries in such a
way that contributes to the lengthening ofconflict, and; (5) "booty futures" however
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salient they are in other situations of resource conflicts, are not as salient in oil civil wars.
Through this cross-case analysis, I hope that the findings uncovered in this study prove to
contribute valuable insights into the realm of resource conflicts. Validating some past
research, and providing areas of study for future research, I hope that this study proves to
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States include: Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Burma/Myanmar, Chad, Colombia, Georgia,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Russia, Sudan, Yemen.
APPENDIXB
MAP OF GAS AND OIL "GIANTS"
This map depicts the known oil and gas "giant" fields in the world. Note the clustering of oil fields
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